> On 28 Oct 2018, at 16:16, Tomas Pales <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 3:37:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 26 Oct 2018, at 21:33, Tomas Pales <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make unnecessary >> assumption. >> >> My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical consistency. > > Logical consistency is an attribute of theories, or some class of chatty > machines. I do not understand what you mean. > > I mean that an object exists iff it is consistently defined. In other words, > it is identical to itself. It is what it is and is not what it is not.
An objet cannot be inconsistent. Its existence can be inconsistent in this or that theory. Consistency is an attribute of theories, or (assertive) machines. > >> This assumption gives rise to the set-theoretic multiverse, > > Which means that your ontological assumption is very strong, and probably > “redundant” with the mechanist phenomenology, extracted from the discourse of > the chatty machine emulated in the arithmetical, or the combinatorical, > reality. > > You may be able to emulate the set-theoretic multiverse inside arithmetic but > it doesn't mean that the set-theoretic multiverse doesn't exist on its own, > beyond arithmetic. If we assume mechanism, a set theoretic ontology, although consistent, is deflationary in its predictions. It predicts too much histories (I suspect this happens even which just the induction axiom). >> You add assumptions that restrict this set-theoretic multiverse to >> arithmetic. > > > I make the assumption that I could survive in principle through a digital > emulation made at some level. > > Ok, but reality seems greater than you and your survival. OK. Absolutely. > > It makes possible to translate the mind-body problem partially into a body > problem in pure arithmetic, or sound extensions of it. > > Set theories, Bosons, and Galaxies, are, well fictions that the (universal, > Löbian) numbers (the “chatty machines”) cannot avoid when trying to > understand where they come from. > > I try to assumes the less to explain the more, or its appearances and > interest. In a sense, I believe in infinity, but I don’t have to put it in > the ontology. “God” can be played by the (sigma_1) arithmetical truth, but it > is not part of the ontology in any communicable way. It is a phenomenon > similar to Gödel’s incompleteness: self-consistency, if true, became false > when even just taken as an axiom/hypothesis. > > I look at a theory always as a machine. ZF exists in arithmetic, and its > multiple emulation, including the evolving one are too. But for doing > metaphysics, ZF, NF, NBG, have too much imagination. And not enough, with > respect to the full phenomenology of the machines. > > If mechanism is false, you may be right. But I am problem driven, so to > convince me, you might solve a problem. Intuitive set theory is nice to do > mathematics, but in metaphysics, better to make strong ontological commitment > only in last resort. I think. > > I think you are trying to assume fewer objects rather than fewer principles. Assuming mechanism, we can only assume the objects K and S, and only two principles: Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz). Or we can assume anything Turing equivalent, and not richer, due to that possibility inflation. > But by assuming fewer objects (only finite natural numbers) you assume more > principles: in addition to the principle of consistency you assume the axioms > of finite arithmetic, to restrict the number of consistent objects to finite > natural numbers. This restriction seems arbitrary; why would only finite > natural numbers exist when it is possible that also other objects exist? Because finite numbers can be shown to have infinite hallucinations, especially when they mess with other finite numbers. And that leads to a testable theology, which includes an explanation of where both quanta and qualia comes from. Then assuming more than that in the ontology, introduces unnecessary difficulties, probably inconsistency or deflation of predictions. (Usually called white rabbit in this list (and in my long version thesis). Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
