> On 29 Oct 2018, at 11:38, Tomas Pales <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 10:35:39 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 28 Oct 2018, at 16:16, Tomas Pales <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sunday, October 28, 2018 at 3:37:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 26 Oct 2018, at 21:33, Tomas Pales <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, October 26, 2018 at 8:06:03 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> OK. But it seemed to me you said that is better not to make unnecessary >>> assumption. >>> >>> My only ontological assumption is that existence is logical consistency. >> >> Logical consistency is an attribute of theories, or some class of chatty >> machines. I do not understand what you mean. >> >> I mean that an object exists iff it is consistently defined. In other words, >> it is identical to itself. It is what it is and is not what it is not. > > > An objet cannot be inconsistent. Its existence can be inconsistent in this or > that theory. > > An object can be inconsistent in the sense that it can be inconsistently > defined
Any object can be inconsistently defined. I can define the moon by the set of squared circles. > - and this I mean in the absolute sense, regardless of theory: an object that > is not identical to itself is inconsistent in any theory. Such an object > cannot exist. All other objects can exist somewhere. You are not using the (logical) terms in their standard meaning. It is hard to follow. I don’t undersetand what you mean by object. > >> But by assuming fewer objects (only finite natural numbers) you assume more >> principles: in addition to the principle of consistency you assume the >> axioms of finite arithmetic, to restrict the number of consistent objects to >> finite natural numbers. This restriction seems arbitrary; why would only >> finite natural numbers exist when it is possible that also other objects >> exist? > > > Because finite numbers can be shown to have infinite hallucinations, > especially when they mess with other finite numbers. And that leads to a > testable theology, which includes an explanation of where both quanta and > qualia comes from. Then assuming more than that in the ontology, introduces > unnecessary difficulties, probably inconsistency or deflation of predictions. > (Usually called white rabbit in this list (and in my long version thesis). > > I understand that not restricting ontology to finite arithmetic can be > impractical or can contain objects whose consistency we cannot confirm. But > reality doesn't seem to care whether we find it practical or whether we can > confirm its consistency. We need to bet on some reality. A (reasonable) theory is consistent if and only if it admits a model/reality. The problem of the ontology is not a practical problem. With mechanism, the axiom of infinity leads to an inflation of predictions, which is not what we are experiencing. Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
