> On 30 Oct 2018, at 10:50, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tuesday, October 30, 2018 at 4:29:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 29 Oct 2018, at 11:24, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> On Monday, October 29, 2018 at 4:35:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Because finite numbers can be shown to have infinite hallucinations, 
>> especially when they mess with other finite numbers. And that leads to a 
>> testable theology, which includes an explanation of where both quanta and 
>> qualia comes from. Then assuming more than that in the ontology, introduces 
>> unnecessary difficulties, probably inconsistency or deflation of 
>> predictions. (Usually called white rabbit in this list (and in my long 
>> version thesis).
>> Bruno
>> Hallucinations and qualia can be derived from numbers (numerical reality) is 
>> one thesis. But what is the test?
>> In material reality, numbers do not exist (aka mathematical fictionalism). 
>> So positing numbers would add more to the ontology (a Platonic realm in 
>> addition to the material realm).
> I do not assume a primary material reality. Eventually, I assume only 
> elementary arithmetic, or elementary combinator theory, and anything Turing 
> equivalent. 
>> Material reality supports both information (numberical) processing and 
>> experience (qualia) processing. The alternative thesis.
> Primary matter is what make the mind-body problem unsolvable. Given the mack 
> of evidence of it, why assume it?
>> That I am conscious is the test that there is a material reality.
> Consciousness does not seem material to me. Consciousness is the test of the 
> existence of consciousness. To infer a material reality from a conscious 
> experience is an extrapolation, and once you bet on mechanism, it does not 
> make much sense. No problem, as you seem both materialist and non mechanist. 
> We are working in different theory.
> Bruno
> I think I've always followed the direction of pragmatism, or more precisely 
> Rortian neopragmatism since Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
> I see the (modal logical) language as explored in "The universal numbers: 
> From Biology to Physics" is of interest to agent programming language 
> theorists (and they indeed utilize those logics in their research).
> But when the "code meets the road" so to speak, and conscious robots need to 
> be compiled, matter will be needed to actually make them, there there is 
> where the matter matters!

But how would a universal number feel a difference of consciousness between 
being in an emulation of the quantum wave of our cluster of galaxies with 
10^100 decimals correct, and being in in such a cluster? 

What role matter plays? If it is only for saying “real”, it is an error in 
metaphysics. You could as well add that we need matter so that God can bless it.

In arithmetic, we don’t have *that* problem, we just listen to the 
machine/numbers, and decide to not treat them as zombie when they complain on 
this or that (the universal number are never 100% satisfied!).

We do have another problem: which is that matter has to emerge from an infinite 
competition in between all universal numbers below our substitution level. But 
that is quite close to Feynman formulation of QM, in a many 
computations/world/mind setting. Where the physicists are confused, the 
mechanist can say we told you. And, oh, yes, the hyper-mechanist can say that 
too, and that is a weakness of my approach, in a sense, which is that we can 
distinguish experimentally between mechanism, hypermechanism, or a number of 
version of mechanism + oracle. But again, that is a reason more to chose the 
simplest option. If we find a reason to believe in miracle, oracle and 
contextual divine entity on the terrestrial plane, it can still be time to 
weaken and generalise the mechanist hypothesis. Note that only the arithmetical 
gods *quite* close to arithmetical truth (which is above all arithmetical gods) 
get supplementary axioms to their self-reference logic G and G*. I have studied 
some of those “gods”, notably those whose “believability” predicate is defined 
by “true in all V_kappa models of ZF”. You need to add []([]A->B) v [](([]B & 
B) -> []A) to G.
With the way I proceed, in is not impossible to test this in some future, in 
the corresponding “material” variant of G, but that is not for tomorrow.


> - pt
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