On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 7:20:18 AM UTC-6, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism. >>>> >>>> >>>> Nietzsche is vindicated. >>>> >>>> >>>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, >>>> perhaps! >>>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology >>>> (capable only of saying what God is not). >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ >>>> 6.2 Perspectivism >>>> >>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his >>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of >>>> perspective. >>>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of >>>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control >>>> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). >>>> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to >>>> be >>>> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a >>>> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; >>>> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; >>>> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much >>>> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong >>>> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points >>>> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this >>>> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking. >>>> >>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in >>>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a >>>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for >>>> ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, >>>> he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive >>>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) >>>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he >>>> writes, >>>> >>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute >>>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the >>>> spirit >>>> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way >>>> for >>>> once, *to want* to see differently, is no small discipline and >>>> preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter >>>> understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept >>>> and >>>> absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra *in >>>> one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to >>>> make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective >>>> interpretations useful for knowledge. (*GM* III, 12) >>>> >>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at >>>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of >>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal >>>> the >>>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. >>>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised >>>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one >>>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, >>>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as >>>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional >>>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a >>>> positive >>>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited >>>> cognitive agent. >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not >>>> with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of >>>> the One, or at least can be interpreted that way. >>>> >>>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure >>>> relativism, which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from >>>> indubitable things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as >>>> the >>>> text above suggested a “revised conception” of objective. >>>> >>>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical >>>> truth), and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by >>>> incompleteness. >>>> >>>> >>>> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different >>>> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different >>>> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive. This goes along >>>> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder. I think he >>>> equated system builders with those who took their perspective to be the >>>> only one. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>> >>> >>> Nietzsche is famous for two quotes: >>> >>> *God is dead!* >>> >>> >>> Yes, he said that. But I think he was talking about Santa Klauss-like >>> notion of God, not about the Neoplatonic conception of God. >>> >> >> >> *What is the Neoplatonic concept of God and how does it differ from >> Spinoza's concept, which IIUC, is some sort of pantheistic monismt? TIA, AG >> * >> >> >> >> Actually, Spinoza is often compared to Neoplatonism, and nobody doubt >> that his work is influenced by Neoplatonism. I just come back (two weeks >> ago) of a colloquium in logic and metaphysics where Spinoza was disced a >> lot. Spinoza describes substance as being self sustained entity, and seems >> to distinguish from Aristotle primary matter, so that his conception of >> reality is often described as neutral monism. That being said, his >> substance is still very Aristotelian, and not much like something in a >> dream or video games. But then, that is not entirely clear in Plotinus too >> (by some aspect, mechanism go farer than Plotinus, at least for the >> motivation). >> >> The “god” of neoplatonism is the ONE, which is though as non describable, >> non definable, and responsible for the Plato world’s of ideas, and then for >> the soul, and eventually for matter which is defined negatively by what god >> (the one) is unable to determine. Matter is when god lose control, and is >> typically associate with evil in the (neo)platonic tradition. You can >> compare the ONE with the class of all sets, or with the “everything” (if >> that exists). Plotinus argue that it is not a being, it is only responsible >> for all beings, but it is out of the reality (somehow, the God of Plotinus >> do not exist!). >> >> With mechanism, the notion of arithmetical truth plays the role of God >> (it is non definable, and responsible for all provabilities and >> computability’s notion, including the knower/soul, consciousness, and >> eventually matter). >> >> You might read my PDF on Plotinus, on my URL (on the front page) for more >> on this. >> >> Bruno >> > > *Truthfully, these Neoplatonic gods, inclusive of Spinoza, seem pretty > bor-ing and IMO don't add anything to our knowledge of the Cosmos. OTOH, > Jesus is dramatic but the overall Judao-Christian idea of God seems pretty > dumb. This "God" is inconsistent in His behavior and only a delusional fool > would trust Him. AG * > >> >> >>
In today's terms, Spinoza is seen as formulating a type of *panpsychism,* and is linked to Leibniz in this context. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ : *Spinoza regarded both mind and matter as simply aspects (or attributes) of the eternal, infinite and unique substance he identified with God Himself.* *e might say that, for Spinoza, physical science is a way of studying the psychology of God. There is nothing in nature that does not have a mental aspect—the proper appreciation of matter itself reveals it to be the other side of a mentalistic coin.* *Leibniz’s view is sometimes caricatured as: Spinoza with infinitely many substances rather than just one. These substances Leibniz called monads. Since they are true substances (able to exist independently of any other thing), and since they are absolutely simple, they cannot interact with each other in any way. Yet each monad carries within it complete information about the entire universe. Space, for Leibniz, was reducible to (non-spatial) similarity or correspondence relationships between the intrinsic natures of the monads.* *Leibniz’s monads are fundamentally to be conceived mentalistically—they are in a way mentalistic automatons moving from one perceptual state (some conscious and some not) to another, all according to a God imposed pre-defined rule. It is highly significant for the development of contemporary forms of panpsychism that Leibniz could find no intrinsic nature for his basic elements other than a mentalistic nature—the only model he found adequate to describe his monads was one of perception and spontaneous activity. This view has been highly influential on the emergence in recent times of Russellian monism, discussed below.* ... - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
