On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:58:21 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 7:20:18 AM UTC-6, [email protected] > wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Nietzsche is vindicated. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, >>>>> perhaps! >>>>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology >>>>> (capable only of saying what God is not). >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ >>>>> 6.2 Perspectivism >>>>> >>>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his >>>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of >>>>> perspective. >>>>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of >>>>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control >>>>> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). >>>>> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to >>>>> be >>>>> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a >>>>> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; >>>>> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; >>>>> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much >>>>> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong >>>>> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points >>>>> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this >>>>> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking. >>>>> >>>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in >>>>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a >>>>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers >>>>> for >>>>> ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, >>>>> he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a >>>>> positive >>>>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to >>>>> be) >>>>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he >>>>> writes, >>>>> >>>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute >>>>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the >>>>> spirit >>>>> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way >>>>> for >>>>> once, *to want* to see differently, is no small discipline and >>>>> preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter >>>>> understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept >>>>> and >>>>> absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra *in >>>>> one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to >>>>> make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective >>>>> interpretations useful for knowledge. (*GM* III, 12) >>>>> >>>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy >>>>> at least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of >>>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal >>>>> the >>>>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. >>>>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised >>>>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one >>>>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of >>>>> others, >>>>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as >>>>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional >>>>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a >>>>> positive >>>>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited >>>>> cognitive agent. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly >>>>> not with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many >>>>> perspective >>>>> of the One, or at least can be interpreted that way. >>>>> >>>>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure >>>>> relativism, which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from >>>>> indubitable things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as >>>>> the >>>>> text above suggested a “revised conception” of objective. >>>>> >>>>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical >>>>> truth), and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by >>>>> incompleteness. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different >>>>> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from >>>>> different >>>>> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive. This goes along >>>>> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder. I think he >>>>> equated system builders with those who took their perspective to be the >>>>> only one. >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Nietzsche is famous for two quotes: >>>> >>>> *God is dead!* >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes, he said that. But I think he was talking about Santa Klauss-like >>>> notion of God, not about the Neoplatonic conception of God. >>>> >>> >>> >>> *What is the Neoplatonic concept of God and how does it differ from >>> Spinoza's concept, which IIUC, is some sort of pantheistic monismt? TIA, AG >>> * >>> >>> >>> >>> Actually, Spinoza is often compared to Neoplatonism, and nobody doubt >>> that his work is influenced by Neoplatonism. I just come back (two weeks >>> ago) of a colloquium in logic and metaphysics where Spinoza was disced a >>> lot. Spinoza describes substance as being self sustained entity, and seems >>> to distinguish from Aristotle primary matter, so that his conception of >>> reality is often described as neutral monism. That being said, his >>> substance is still very Aristotelian, and not much like something in a >>> dream or video games. But then, that is not entirely clear in Plotinus too >>> (by some aspect, mechanism go farer than Plotinus, at least for the >>> motivation). >>> >>> The “god” of neoplatonism is the ONE, which is though as non >>> describable, non definable, and responsible for the Plato world’s of ideas, >>> and then for the soul, and eventually for matter which is defined >>> negatively by what god (the one) is unable to determine. Matter is when god >>> lose control, and is typically associate with evil in the (neo)platonic >>> tradition. You can compare the ONE with the class of all sets, or with the >>> “everything” (if that exists). Plotinus argue that it is not a being, it is >>> only responsible for all beings, but it is out of the reality (somehow, the >>> God of Plotinus do not exist!). >>> >>> With mechanism, the notion of arithmetical truth plays the role of God >>> (it is non definable, and responsible for all provabilities and >>> computability’s notion, including the knower/soul, consciousness, and >>> eventually matter). >>> >>> You might read my PDF on Plotinus, on my URL (on the front page) for >>> more on this. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >> >> *Truthfully, these Neoplatonic gods, inclusive of Spinoza, seem pretty >> bor-ing and IMO don't add anything to our knowledge of the Cosmos. OTOH, >> Jesus is dramatic but the overall Judao-Christian idea of God seems pretty >> dumb. This "God" is inconsistent in His behavior and only a delusional fool >> would trust Him. AG * >> >>> >>> >>> > > > In today's terms, Spinoza is seen as formulating a type of *panpsychism,* > and is linked to Leibniz in this context. > > > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ : > > > *Spinoza regarded both mind and matter as simply aspects (or attributes) > of the eternal, infinite and unique substance he identified with God > Himself.* > > *e might say that, for Spinoza, physical science is a way of studying the > psychology of God. There is nothing in nature that does not have a mental > aspect—the proper appreciation of matter itself reveals it to be the other > side of a mentalistic coin.* > > *Leibniz’s view is sometimes caricatured as: Spinoza with infinitely many > substances rather than just one. These substances Leibniz called monads. > Since they are true substances (able to exist independently of any other > thing), and since they are absolutely simple, they cannot interact with > each other in any way. Yet each monad carries within it complete > information about the entire universe. Space, for Leibniz, was reducible to > (non-spatial) similarity or correspondence relationships between the > intrinsic natures of the monads.* > > *Leibniz’s monads are fundamentally to be conceived mentalistically—they > are in a way mentalistic automatons moving from one perceptual state (some > conscious and some not) to another, all according to a God imposed > pre-defined rule. It is highly significant for the development of > contemporary forms of panpsychism that Leibniz could find no intrinsic > nature for his basic elements other than a mentalistic nature—the only > model he found adequate to describe his monads was one of perception and > spontaneous activity. This view has been highly influential on the > emergence in recent times of Russellian monism, discussed below.* > > ... > > - pt >
I admit to not being the brightest bulb in the Cosmos, but I don't see anything intelligible in these formulations of "God", or whatever. AG -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
