> On 9 Dec 2018, at 18:01, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:27:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 6 Dec 2018, at 14:20, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Nietzsche is vindicated. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, >>>>>>> perhaps! >>>>>>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology >>>>>>> (capable only of saying what God is not). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ >>>>>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/> >>>>>> 6.2 Perspectivism >>>>>> >>>>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his >>>>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of >>>>>> perspective. He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the >>>>>> influence of their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore >>>>>> failed to control those perspectival effects (BGE 6; see BGE I more >>>>>> generally). Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what >>>>>> has come to be called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a >>>>>> major concern in a number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, >>>>>> e.g., Danto 1965; Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas >>>>>> 1985; Clark 1990; Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has >>>>>> been as much contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of >>>>>> commitments belong under that heading as about their philosophical >>>>>> merits, but a few points are relatively uncontroversial and can provide >>>>>> a useful way into this strand of Nietzsche’s thinking. >>>>>> >>>>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in >>>>>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a >>>>>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers >>>>>> for ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we >>>>>> saw, he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a >>>>>> positive contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he >>>>>> takes to be) the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past >>>>>> philosophers, he writes, >>>>>> >>>>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute >>>>>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the >>>>>> spirit has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in >>>>>> this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline >>>>>> and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter >>>>>> understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept >>>>>> and absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra >>>>>> in one’s power, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to >>>>>> make precisely the difference in perspectives and affective >>>>>> interpretations useful for knowledge. (GM III, 12) >>>>>> >>>>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at >>>>>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of >>>>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal >>>>>> the way things really are, independently of any point of view >>>>>> whatsoever. Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a >>>>>> revised conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between >>>>>> one perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of >>>>>> others, without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so >>>>>> much as possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the >>>>>> traditional picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is >>>>>> equally a positive set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge >>>>>> as a finite, limited cognitive agent. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not >>>>> with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of >>>>> the One, or at least can be interpreted that way. >>>>> >>>>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure relativism, >>>>> which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from indubitable >>>>> things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as the text >>>>> above suggested a “revised conception” of objective. >>>>> >>>>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical >>>>> truth), and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by >>>>> incompleteness. >>>> >>>> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different >>>> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different >>>> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive. This goes along >>>> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder. I think he >>>> equated system builders with those who took their perspective to be the >>>> only one. >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> >>>> Nietzsche is famous for two quotes: >>>> >>>> God is dead! >>> >>> Yes, he said that. But I think he was talking about Santa Klauss-like >>> notion of God, not about the Neoplatonic conception of God. >>> >>> What is the Neoplatonic concept of God and how does it differ from >>> Spinoza's concept, which IIUC, is some sort of pantheistic monismt? TIA, AG >> >> >> Actually, Spinoza is often compared to Neoplatonism, and nobody doubt that >> his work is influenced by Neoplatonism. I just come back (two weeks ago) of >> a colloquium in logic and metaphysics where Spinoza was disced a lot. >> Spinoza describes substance as being self sustained entity, and seems to >> distinguish from Aristotle primary matter, so that his conception of reality >> is often described as neutral monism. That being said, his substance is >> still very Aristotelian, and not much like something in a dream or video >> games. But then, that is not entirely clear in Plotinus too (by some aspect, >> mechanism go farer than Plotinus, at least for the motivation). >> >> The “god” of neoplatonism is the ONE, which is though as non describable, >> non definable, and responsible for the Plato world’s of ideas, and then for >> the soul, and eventually for matter which is defined negatively by what god >> (the one) is unable to determine. Matter is when god lose control, and is >> typically associate with evil in the (neo)platonic tradition. You can >> compare the ONE with the class of all sets, or with the “everything” (if >> that exists). Plotinus argue that it is not a being, it is only responsible >> for all beings, but it is out of the reality (somehow, the God of Plotinus >> do not exist!). >> >> With mechanism, the notion of arithmetical truth plays the role of God (it >> is non definable, and responsible for all provabilities and computability’s >> notion, including the knower/soul, consciousness, and eventually matter). >> >> You might read my PDF on Plotinus, on my URL (on the front page) for more on >> this. >> >> Bruno >> >> Truthfully, these Neoplatonic gods, inclusive of Spinoza, seem pretty >> bor-ing and IMO don't add anything to our knowledge of the Cosmos. OTOH, >> Jesus is dramatic but the overall Judao-Christian idea of God seems pretty >> dumb. This "God" is inconsistent in His behavior and only a delusional fool >> would trust Him. AG > > > If you are interested in the cosmos, you can study cosmology. This assumes > some cosmos, but is neutral on its nature. > But if you are interested in the fundamental science (metaphysics, theology) > then it is a different domain. > > These fields are quite distinct from "fundamental science”.
Only since 529. Only because theology has been stolen to the academy to be used as an oppression instrument by pseudo-politics and states. > No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG. Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the made “stealing” was made in 1248. Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science. > > In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with > Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its appearance > comes from something else, non physical. > > Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and Materialism, > and why are they incompatible? AG Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised sense). To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness (or you can assume it outright). But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we do the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any evidences. Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. Non-mechanism assumes actual infinities in nature, and is inconsistent with Darwinism, molecular biology, thermodynamic, quantum mechanics. If the logic of matter (Z1*) extracted from the universal machine structure was violating the empirical physical reality, that would be extraordinary, but, thanks to QM, it fits better with the facts than materialism, which has never succeeded nor even propose an experimental test. > > The god of Plato and the neoplatonist is by definition the fundamental > reality. > > I read some Plato as an undergraduate. Don't recall any "god" in his writings, He uses the term God. But Plato’s God is simply the truth that we search, with the understanding it is above us. Plato identified it at some point with the “world of ideas”, but the neoplatonist will consider that the world of ideas emanates from some absolute and non describable truth. With Mechanism, the arithmetical truth is enough (and at some point, even a quite tiny part of it will be enough, but in a non provable way). > or from any source that it defines "fundamental reality". AG Many scholars agree on this. See the little book by Hirschberger for example. > > Today most christians are materialist, and, as I said, materialism is > incompatible with mechanism (in a testable way). > But before 529, many educated christians were still more platonism than > Aristotelian, which are dogmatic on (primitive) matter. > > For a neoplatonist, christianism and atheism is very much alike. > > Then the neoplatonists are totally misinformed and unworthy of trust. AG Not at all. It is obvious that strong-atheists (non agnostic atheism) always defend the same conception of God than the christians (even if it is just to deny it), and have the same belief in the second God of Aristotle (parity matter). And the strong-atheists helps a lot the christians in bashing the scientific theology of the greeks. Stron-atheism is really basically the same as christianity: it is materialism. > > Same conception of god > > No way! Christians believe in a personal god who came to Earth to redeem > their sins, a form of theism, and atheists don't believe in any god, But then conclude that there is no god at all, and that the notion of God available is only the christian one. When we say that God cannot be omniscient (for pure logical reason), the atheists replies by saying that we cannot change the definition. They would have said that Earth does not exist when it was discovered that it is round! Of course, in science we change the definition *all the time*. > but for you their beliefs are the same? How ridiculous this is! AG Same belief in Matter (which is the God incompatible with Mechanism). Same belief that God = the Christian God only (total oversight of a millenium of scientific theology!). They don’t have the same belief in God, but they share the same definition (curiously enough). Then, they do share the same belief in the creation. In the Aristotelian view, Mechanism is super-atheists: no Creator, no Creation. In the Plationcian view, Mechanism is super-religious: only God exist (arithmetical truth), the rest emerges from it from internal indexical (given by the logic of self-reference). Bruno > > (even if the atheist uses it only to deny it), and same dogmatic attitude for > the existence of some matter not reducible to immaterial notions (like in > mathematics). > > Bruno > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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