On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 8:25:47 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> Perspectivism is a form of modalism. >> >> >> Nietzsche is vindicated. >> >> >> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, >> perhaps! >> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology >> (capable only of saying what God is not). >> >> Bruno >> >> >> From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ >> 6.2 Perspectivism >> >> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his >> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of perspective. >> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of >> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control >> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). >> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to be >> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a >> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; >> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; >> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much >> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong >> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points >> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this >> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking. >> >> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in his >> usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a critical >> side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for ignoring >> the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, he >> simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive >> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) >> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he >> writes, >> >> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute >> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the spirit >> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way for >> once, *to want* to see differently, is no small discipline and >> preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter >> understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept and >> absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra *in >> one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to >> make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective >> interpretations useful for knowledge. (*GM* III, 12) >> >> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at >> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of >> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal the >> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. >> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised >> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one >> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, >> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as >> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional >> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a positive >> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited >> cognitive agent. >> >> >> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not >> with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of >> the One, or at least can be interpreted that way. >> >> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure relativism, >> which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from indubitable >> things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as the text above >> suggested a “revised conception” of objective. >> >> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical >> truth), and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by >> incompleteness. >> >> >> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different >> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different >> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive. This goes along >> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder. I think he >> equated system builders with those who took their perspective to be the >> only one. >> >> Brent >> > > > Nietzsche is famous for two quotes: > > *God is dead!* >
*Those who don't grasp Nietzsche love that quote. In context, he meant that the sense or presence of God or Divinity has waned from modern human consciousness. AG * > > *There are no facts, only interpretations.* > > > Notebooks (Summer 1886 – Fall 1887) > > - Variant translation: Against that positivism which stops before > phenomena, saying "there are only facts," I should say: no, *it is > precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations…* > - As translated in *The Portable Nietzsche* (1954) by Walter > Kaufmann <https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Walter_Kaufmann>, p. 458 > > [ https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Friedrich_Nietzsche ] > > > I guess a perspective and an interpretation are pretty much the same > things. > > - pt > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
