On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected] <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
>
>
> Nietzsche is vindicated.
>
>
> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
> perhaps!
> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
> (capable only of saying what God is not).
>
> Bruno
>
>
> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
> 6.2 Perspectivism 
>
> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of perspective. 
> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control 
> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). 
> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to be 
> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a 
> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; 
> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; 
> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much 
> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong 
> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points 
> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this 
> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>
> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in his 
> usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a critical 
> side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for ignoring 
> the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, he 
> simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive 
> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) 
> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
> writes,
>
> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the spirit 
> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way for 
> once, *to want* to see differently, is no small discipline and 
> preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter 
> understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept and 
> absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra *in 
> one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to make 
> precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective interpretations 
> useful for knowledge. (*GM* III, 12)
>
> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal the 
> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, 
> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a positive 
> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited 
> cognitive agent.
>
>
> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not 
> with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of 
> the One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
>
> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure relativism, 
> which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from indubitable 
> things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as the text above 
> suggested a “revised conception” of objective. 
>
> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical truth), 
> and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by incompleteness.
>
>
> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different 
> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different 
> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive.  This goes along 
> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder.  I think he 
> equated system builders with those who took their perspective to be the 
> only one.
>
> Brent
>


Nietzsche  is famous for two quotes:

*God is dead!*

*There are no facts, only interpretations.*


Notebooks (Summer 1886 – Fall 1887)

   - Variant translation: Against that positivism which stops before 
   phenomena, saying "there are only facts," I should say: no, *it is 
   precisely facts that do not exist, only interpretations…*
      - As translated in *The Portable Nietzsche* (1954) by Walter Kaufmann 
      <https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Walter_Kaufmann>, p. 458
   
[ https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Friedrich_Nietzsche ]


I guess a perspective and an interpretation are pretty much the same things.

- pt 

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