On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 12:11:31 PM UTC-6, [email protected] 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:58:21 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 7:20:18 AM UTC-6, [email protected] 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, [email protected] wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nietzsche is vindicated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
>>>>>> perhaps!
>>>>>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
>>>>>> (capable only of saying what God is not).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
>>>>>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>>>>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of 
>>>>>> perspective. 
>>>>>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
>>>>>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to 
>>>>>> control 
>>>>>> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). 
>>>>>> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to 
>>>>>> be 
>>>>>> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a 
>>>>>> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; 
>>>>>> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; 
>>>>>> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much 
>>>>>> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong 
>>>>>> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points 
>>>>>> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this 
>>>>>> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
>>>>>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
>>>>>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers 
>>>>>> for 
>>>>>> ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we 
>>>>>> saw, 
>>>>>> he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a 
>>>>>> positive 
>>>>>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to 
>>>>>> be) 
>>>>>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
>>>>>> writes,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such 
>>>>>> resolute reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with 
>>>>>> which 
>>>>>> the spirit has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently 
>>>>>> in 
>>>>>> this way for once, *to want* to see differently, is no small 
>>>>>> discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future 
>>>>>> “objectivity”—the latter understood not as “disinterested contemplation” 
>>>>>> (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but rather as the capacity to 
>>>>>> have 
>>>>>> one’s Pro and Contra *in one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, 
>>>>>> so that one knows how to make precisely the *difference* in 
>>>>>> perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge. (
>>>>>> *GM* III, 12)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy 
>>>>>> at least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>>>>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal 
>>>>>> the 
>>>>>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
>>>>>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
>>>>>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
>>>>>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of 
>>>>>> others, 
>>>>>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
>>>>>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
>>>>>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a 
>>>>>> positive 
>>>>>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, 
>>>>>> limited 
>>>>>> cognitive agent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly 
>>>>>> not with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many 
>>>>>> perspective 
>>>>>> of the One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure 
>>>>>> relativism, which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting 
>>>>>> from 
>>>>>> indubitable things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as 
>>>>>> the 
>>>>>> text above suggested a “revised conception” of objective. 
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical 
>>>>>> truth), and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by 
>>>>>> incompleteness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different 
>>>>>> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from 
>>>>>> different 
>>>>>> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive.  This goes 
>>>>>> along 
>>>>>> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder.  I think he 
>>>>>> equated system builders with those who took their perspective to be the 
>>>>>> only one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nietzsche  is famous for two quotes:
>>>>>
>>>>> *God is dead!*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, he said that. But I think he was talking about Santa Klauss-like 
>>>>> notion of God, not about the Neoplatonic conception of God.
>>>>>
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>> *What is the Neoplatonic concept of God and how does it differ from 
>>>> Spinoza's concept, which IIUC, is some sort of pantheistic monismt? TIA, 
>>>> AG 
>>>> *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Actually, Spinoza is often compared to Neoplatonism, and nobody doubt 
>>>> that his work is influenced by Neoplatonism. I just come back (two weeks 
>>>> ago) of a colloquium in logic and metaphysics where Spinoza was disced a 
>>>> lot. Spinoza describes substance as being self sustained entity, and seems 
>>>> to distinguish from Aristotle primary matter, so that his conception of 
>>>> reality is often described as neutral monism. That being said, his 
>>>> substance is still very Aristotelian, and not much like something in a 
>>>> dream or video games. But then, that is not entirely clear in Plotinus too 
>>>> (by some aspect, mechanism go farer than Plotinus, at least for the 
>>>> motivation).
>>>>
>>>> The “god” of neoplatonism is the ONE, which is though as non 
>>>> describable, non definable, and responsible for the Plato world’s of 
>>>> ideas, 
>>>> and then for the soul, and eventually for matter which is defined 
>>>> negatively by what god (the one) is unable to determine. Matter is when 
>>>> god 
>>>> lose control, and is typically associate with evil in the (neo)platonic 
>>>> tradition. You can compare the ONE with the class of all sets, or with the 
>>>> “everything” (if that exists). Plotinus argue that it is not a being, it 
>>>> is 
>>>> only responsible for all beings, but it is out of the reality (somehow, 
>>>> the 
>>>> God of Plotinus do not exist!). 
>>>>
>>>> With mechanism, the notion of arithmetical truth plays the role of God 
>>>> (it is non definable, and responsible for all provabilities and 
>>>> computability’s notion, including the knower/soul, consciousness, and 
>>>> eventually matter).
>>>>
>>>> You might read my PDF on Plotinus, on my URL (on the front page) for 
>>>> more on this.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>
>>> *Truthfully, these Neoplatonic gods, inclusive of Spinoza, seem pretty 
>>> bor-ing and IMO don't add anything to our knowledge of the Cosmos. OTOH, 
>>> Jesus is dramatic but the overall Judao-Christian idea of God seems pretty 
>>> dumb. This "God" is inconsistent in His behavior and only a delusional fool 
>>> would trust Him. AG *
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>
>>
>> In today's terms, Spinoza is seen as formulating a type of *panpsychism,* 
>> and is linked to Leibniz in this context.
>>
>>
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/ :
>>
>>
>> *Spinoza regarded both mind and matter as simply aspects (or attributes) 
>> of the eternal, infinite and unique substance he identified with God 
>> Himself.*
>>
>> *e might say that, for Spinoza, physical science is a way of studying the 
>> psychology of God. There is nothing in nature that does not have a mental 
>> aspect—the proper appreciation of matter itself reveals it to be the other 
>> side of a mentalistic coin.*
>>
>> *Leibniz’s view is sometimes caricatured as: Spinoza with infinitely many 
>> substances rather than just one. These substances Leibniz called monads. 
>> Since they are true substances (able to exist independently of any other 
>> thing), and since they are absolutely simple, they cannot interact with 
>> each other in any way. Yet each monad carries within it complete 
>> information about the entire universe. Space, for Leibniz, was reducible to 
>> (non-spatial) similarity or correspondence relationships between the 
>> intrinsic natures of the monads.*
>>
>> *Leibniz’s monads are fundamentally to be conceived mentalistically—they 
>> are in a way mentalistic automatons moving from one perceptual state (some 
>> conscious and some not) to another, all according to a God imposed 
>> pre-defined rule. It is highly significant for the development of 
>> contemporary forms of panpsychism that Leibniz could find no intrinsic 
>> nature for his basic elements other than a mentalistic nature—the only 
>> model he found adequate to describe his monads was one of perception and 
>> spontaneous activity. This view has been highly influential on the 
>> emergence in recent times of Russellian monism, discussed below.*
>>
>> ...
>>
>> - pt 
>>
>
> I admit to not being the brightest bulb in the Cosmos, but I don't see 
> anything intelligible in these formulations of "God", or whatever. AG 
>



Aspects of the Leibniz monad (e.g. *each monad carries within it complete 
information about the entire universe*) has made its way into programming 
terminology (continuations, etc.)



-pt

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