On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > > > On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> >> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is >>> primary. That is, that matter is not derivative from something more >>> fundamental. >>> >>> Jason >>> >> >> >> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal >> numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [ >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely >> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then >> why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual >> matter itself would seem to be superfluous. >> >> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and >> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of >> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into >> existence. >> >> >> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations >> of matter how is it not "actual" matter? Bruno's idea is that >> consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter. >> So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those >> conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets. >> Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of >> God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff. >> > > It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's > paper: > > In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this >> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future >> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, >> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure >> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability >> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then >> the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract >> insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant. > > > Jason >
What is the computer that running "her computational universe"? What is its power supply? - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
