> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:53, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > > On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker <meek...@verizon.net > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >> >> >> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is >> primary. That is, that matter is not derivative from something more >> fundamental. >> >> Jason >> >> >> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. The universal >> numbers. From Biology to Physics. Marchal B [ >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 >> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993> ]) as providing a purely >> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then why >> would actual matter need to come into existence at all? Actual matter itself >> would seem to be superfluous. >> >> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and >> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of >> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into >> existence. > > If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations of > matter how is it not "actual" matter? Bruno's idea is that consciousness of > matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter. So if the > "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those conscious thoughts > about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets. Remember Bruno is a > theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of God=arithmetic; and > arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff. > > It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's paper: > > In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this > “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future > observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, > since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure µ > that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability close > to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then the > corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract insights > into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant. > > Jason > > > > > > What is the computer that running "her computational universe”?
With mechanism, there is no computational physical universe at all, as the physical universe is a non computable emergence from all computations. Digital physics is just an inconsistent idea, as it implies computationalism, and computationalism makes physics into a non computational entity. > > What is its power supply? Power emerges from 2+2=4. You don’t need any power for this to be true. It is a fact, and it is unrelated to anything physical. You need it, though, just to define what is power. Bruno > > - pt > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com>. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com > <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
