> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:53, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: > > > On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: >> >> >> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is >> primary. That is, that matter is not derivative from something more >> fundamental. >> >> Jason >> >> >> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. The universal >> numbers. From Biology to Physics. Marchal B [ >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 >> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993> ]) as providing a purely >> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then why >> would actual matter need to come into existence at all? Actual matter itself >> would seem to be superfluous. >> >> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and >> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of >> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into >> existence. > > If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations of > matter how is it not "actual" matter? Bruno's idea is that consciousness of > matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter. So if the > "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those conscious thoughts > about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets. Remember Bruno is a > theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of God=arithmetic; and > arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff. > > It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's paper: > > In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this > “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future > observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, > since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure µ > that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability close > to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then the > corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract insights > into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant. > > Jason > > > > > > What is the computer that running "her computational universe”?
With mechanism, there is no computational physical universe at all, as the physical universe is a non computable emergence from all computations. Digital physics is just an inconsistent idea, as it implies computationalism, and computationalism makes physics into a non computational entity. > > What is its power supply? Power emerges from 2+2=4. You don’t need any power for this to be true. It is a fact, and it is unrelated to anything physical. You need it, though, just to define what is power. Bruno > > - pt > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
