> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>>>>>>> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
>>>>>>> call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
>>>>>>> Galen Strawson):
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>>>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>>>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>>>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>>>>>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/> ]
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>  -pt
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>>>>>  
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>>>>>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/>] — where 
>>>>>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>>>>>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>>>>>> fiction.)
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>>>>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>>>>> math-fictionanlist.
>>>>> 
>>>>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
>>>>> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
>>>>> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
>>>>> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
>>>>> solutions.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>>>>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>>>>> (like us).
>>>>> 
>>>>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
>>>> 
>>>> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
>>>> than in the moon.
>>>> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
>>>> the computationalist theory of mind.
>>>> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
>>>> are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of 
>>>> the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> Example: The Turing 
>>>>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>>>>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>>>>  
>>>>> <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html>
>>>>>  ].
>>>> 
>>>> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
>>>> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
>>>> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
>>>> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
>>>> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
>>>>> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>>>>> "boring”.)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
>>>> machine) in Turing sense.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
>>>> non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>>>> 
>>>> Bruno
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
>>>> 
>>>> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/ <http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/>  - International 
>>>> Center of Unconventional Computing
>>>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ <http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/> - 
>>>> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 
>>>> 2019
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing 
>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing>
>>>> etc.
>>> 
>>> Does it assumes that Church’s thesis is false?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> One just uses the term  unconventional computation or unconventional 
>>>> computing - a widely used term - and people will understand the 
>>>> non-standard non-assumptions.
>>> 
>>> Widely used does not mean that the notion is clear. I have been asked to 
>>> participate to a book in unconventional computing (which has been published 
>>> since, but I don’t find the reference now).
>>> Natural computing seems to me based on a misunderstanding of Turing’s 
>>> notion of computation.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Of course UC says CTT is false. 
>> 
>> 
>> Some UC people might say that. Others are neutral. Others accept CTT.
>> 
>> CTT implies incompleteness directly (in one diagonalisation, as I showed 
>> recently in the Church’s thesis thread. (I do it again if you want). 
>> 
>> CT saves the numbers and the machine from all conventional conception of 
>> them.
>> 
>> CT + Mechanism implies a Negative Theology, like in the line from Parmenides 
>> to Damascius.
>> 
>> CT implies that to get control on the security zone you are confronted to 
>> the insecurity zone. 
>> 
>> After Gödel, we have to abandon our reductionist conception of numbers and 
>> machines.
>> 
>> Beware the Unconventional Digital Machine. Beware the Unconventional Numbers.
>> 
>> You know, there is a common argument against the idea that Jesus-Christ did 
>> really transform some water into wine, or that we should take seriously a 
>> witnessing of it. The argument is that, if that event actually occurred, the 
>> most plausible explanation would be that Jesus Christ would be a 
>> prestidigitator, given the known ability of prestidigitators and the high 
>> credulity of humans in general.
>> 
>> Now, I am not sure what it means exactly by believing in universe, gods, and 
>> non conventional things, I think that the simplest explanation is the (not 
>> well known yet already practiced) prestidigitation ability of the numbers. 
>> The universal numbers, notably, can make you believe a lot of things.
>> 
>> I am skeptical about adding complexity when we are understanding that we 
>> already do not understand the simplest things.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> (Pragmatists don't get "hung up" with truth, as you know.) 
>> 
>> 
>> Only until they are confronted with it.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> It's the UCNC conferences, which is a bit odd, but they put UC and NC 
>>> together. I don't really like NC. Just UC, since I think that's clearer. 
>> 
>> 
>> It is more unconventional thinking about things, without being involved 
>> necessarily in metaphysics, more in application down to earth.
>> 
>> If CTT is judged conventional, I think that this is a mistake, as CT enforce 
>> the failing of all conventional conception we can have of the machine. It 
>> can only be a sort of misunderstanding of CTT. 
>> 
>> There are simple things easy to define, but explosive in complexity, like 
>> when mixing addition and multiplication, or application and abstraction.
>> 
>> The use of “unconventional” is weird, as I am not sure it can work with the 
>> universal machine, which might transcend all conventions.
>> 
>> Anyway, with the distinction imposed by incompleteness on the self modes of 
>> view, we can see the universal machine is born a bit schizophrenic and is 
>> always capable of being deluded. 
>> 
>> On day one, God created the Natural Numbers, and said “that is good”.
>> 
>> On day two, God told the Numbers “Add yourself”, and said”Oh! That is good”.
>> 
>> On day three, God told the Numbers “multiply yourself”. And God said … 
>> “Oops!”.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> vs. the CT thesis, there is the PLTOS thesis:
>> 
>> From [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>> <https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/> ]:
>> 
>> 0.1. PTLOS configurations
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> A configuration PTLOS(π,λ,τ,ο,Σ) — lower case Greek letters π, λ, τ, ο, and 
>> capital Greek letter Σ are variables that take on concrete (particular) 
>> values — is defined:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> PLTOS(π,λ,τ,ο,Σ) designates a program π that is written in a language λ that 
>> is transformed via a compiler/assembler τ into an output object ο that 
>> executes in a computing substrate Σ.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 0.2. “Material PLTOS Thesis”:
>> 
>> 
>> Every material (alt. physical) phenomenon can be effectively represented by 
>> some PLTOS(π,λ,τ,ο,Σ).
>> 
>> 
>> ...
>> 
>> 
>> In PLTOS, numbers are not the "basic" substrate. Materialities* are.
> 
> 
> You might explain in simple term why you think so. What do you mean by 
> materialities, where they come from, and how you link it to mind. You need a 
> non computationalist theory, as computationalism (digital mechanism) is 
> non-sensical when we use the classical standard definition of computation or 
> Church’s thesis.
> 
> Usually, non mechanist theory of mind use ontological commitment (matter, 
> god, …), but still fail to explain how they relate mind and matter. It is 
> either fairy tales, like with bibles and “sacred texts”, or vey obscure.
> 
> Showing one particular formal system is not enough.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The "conventional" definition of computing is of course in the standard 
> mathematical discourse of the Turing machine.  
> 
> Where "unconventional" computing (UC) deviates is that instead of a 
> definition of a machine that "manipulates symbols" [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine ], the machine manipulates 
> actual material objects: atoms, molecules, cells, ... (rather than just 
> symbolic representations of these objects).


I cannot make sense of this. In arithmetic, the Turing machine are confronted 
all the times, from their points of view, with non computable objects, indeed 
like “matter”. Their won soul is a non computable, even non describable 
objects. 

The conventional Turing machine is enforced to manipulate and live … 
unconventionally with this definition.




> 
> What this means is that for UC there is a phenomenal/physical semantics  in 
> addition to the standard informational semantics [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_(computer_science) ] of computing.

That is confirmed and made precise by conventional computing. Adding 
unconventional things in the ontology is not needed. The []p & p nuance of the 
computable []p gives a non computable, even non describable phenomenology. 

Bruno




> 
> 
> Susan Stepney. 
> Programming Unconventional Computers: dynamics, development, self-reference 
> <https://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/susan/bib/ss/nonstd/entropy12.htm>. 
> Entropy, 14(10), 1939-1952, 2012
>  https://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/susan/bib/ss/nonstd/index.htm
> 
> - pt
> 
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