> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:37, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 11:18:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 12 Dec 2018, at 12:54, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 5:09:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:58, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". >>>> >>>> (Derrida, Rorty, …) >>> >>> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not >>> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some >>> reality. >>> >>> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some “religions” >>> do, although only when they are used for that purpose. Some philosophies >>> vindicate their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads to >>> relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any idea, >>> but eventually it hurts in front of the truth. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) >>> lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger? >>> >>> I've been following him like forever. >>> >>> * e.g. >>> Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers have the >>> good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of professional >>> mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that in many cases >>> is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" that are >>> completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called infinity. >> Mechanism proves this. Arithmetic, without infinity axiom, even without the >> induction axiom, is the “ontological things”. Induction axioms, infinity, >> physics, humans, etc. belongs to the phenomenology. The phenomenology is not >> less real, but its is not primary, it is second order, and that fiction is >> needed to survive, even if fictionally. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> To experiential realists, phenomenal consciousness is a real thing. > > That is what the soul of the machine ([]p & p) says to itself (1p) correctly. > It is real indeed. But it is non definable, and non provable. The machine’s > soul knows that her soul is not a machine, nor even anything describable in > any 3p terms. > > > > > >> >> To real (experiential) materialists (panpsychism), consciousness is >> intrinsic to matter (like electric charge, etc.). So that would make >> consciousness primary. > > Then you better need to say “no” to the doctor who propose you a digital body. > > But are you OK that your daughter marry a man who got one such digital body > in his childhood, to survive some disease? > > You might say yes, and invoke the fact that he is material. The point will be > that if he survives through a *digital* substitution, it can be shown that no > universal machine at all is unable to distinguish, without observable clue, a > physical reality from any of infinitely many emulation of approximations of > that physical reality at some level of substitution (fine grained, with > 10^100 decimals correct, for example). Then, infinitely many such > approximation exists in arithmetic, even in diophantine polynomial equation, > and the invariance of the first person for “delays of reconstitution” > (definable by the number of steps done by the universal dovetailer to get the > relevant states) entails that the 1p is confronted with a continuum. The math > shows that it has to be a special (models of []p & p, and []p & <>t & p. [] > is the arithmetical “beweisbar” predicate of provability of Gödel 1931. It is > my generic Gödel-Löbian machine, shortly: Löbian. They obeys to the formula > of modesty of Löb: []([]p -> p) -> []p. It represents a scheme of theorems of > PA saying that PA is close for the Löb rule: if you convince PA that the > provability of the existence of Santa Klauss entails the existence of Santa > Klauss, then PA will soon or later prove the existence of Santa Klauss. Put > in another way, unless PA proves something, she will never prove that the > provability of something entails that something. PA is maximally modest on > her own provability ability. > > In particular, with f the constant proposition false, consistency, the ~[]f, > equivalent with []f -> f, is not provable, so []p -> p is in general not > provable and is not a theorem of PA. > > Incompleteness enforces the nuances between > > Truth p > Provable []p > Knowable []p & p > Observable []p & <>t. (t = propositional constant true, <> = ~[]~ > = consistent) > Sensible []p & <>t > > And incompleteness also doubles, or split, the provable, the observable and > the sensible along the provable/true parts, G and G*. > That gives 8 personal points of view on the (sigma_1) Arithmetic. 5 > “terrestrial” (provable) and 5 “divine” (true but non provable) modes on the > Self, with two of them (Truth and Knowable) at the intersection of Earth > (effective, provable) and Heaven (truth). > > The beauty is that G* proves p <-> []p <-> []p&p <-> []p&<>t <-> []p&<>t&p, > but G proves virtually none. (p sigma_1). In this setting p -> []p is > equivalent with sigma_1 completeness, or Turing universality, and the Löbian > entities typically can prove all p -> []p formula. But the consistent machine > cannot prove []p -> p in general. That is why the logic and the mathematics > of all the nuances differ a lot from the machine's local point of view, > despite they true equivalence. > > Bruno > > >> >> >> https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/ >> <https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/> >> >> - pt > > > > > As for a new digital body, I could likely accept it if it were a hybrid > digital/biological body (e.g. the biopolymers being used to make synthetic > neurons today). That is the future of biocomputing technology. - and it may > be for pragmatic (power consumption) as well as scientific reasons for doing > so.
I can understand the pragmatic reason, but everything known about Nature is known to be Turing emulable, except the first person indeterminacy, but that is the case for the machine too. Now, if we believe that there is a reduction of wave packet which would be a physical phenomemon, then mechanism is just false. But there is no evidence for this. > > As for its "machinery", its informational semantics (as you have defined > above) may be that of a higher-order theorem prover: Combianatory logic is an all-order logic (arguably). > > Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with Higher-order > Automated Theorem Provers > http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic NOT available for the machines. > > (One can prove it has a "soul”?) []p & p. I identify the soul with the knower, a bit like in Bréhier’s translation of Plotinus (in French). > > But such a (hybrid) body would have an informational (physical) and an > experiential semantics. []p & p, and []p & <>t & p provides experiential semantics to machines, and a rich theory of consciousness explains why it seems to be an elusive notion. Matter is recovered so we can test all this. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
