On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:32:51 PM UTC, [email protected] wrote:
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>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 10:12:54 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 9 Dec 2018, at 18:01, [email protected] wrote:
>>
>>
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>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:27:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 14:20, [email protected] wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, [email protected] wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nietzsche is vindicated.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
>>>>>> perhaps!
>>>>>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
>>>>>> (capable only of saying what God is not).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
>>>>>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>>>>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of 
>>>>>> perspective. 
>>>>>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
>>>>>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to 
>>>>>> control 
>>>>>> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). 
>>>>>> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to 
>>>>>> be 
>>>>>> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a 
>>>>>> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; 
>>>>>> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; 
>>>>>> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much 
>>>>>> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong 
>>>>>> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points 
>>>>>> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this 
>>>>>> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
>>>>>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
>>>>>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers 
>>>>>> for 
>>>>>> ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we 
>>>>>> saw, 
>>>>>> he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a 
>>>>>> positive 
>>>>>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to 
>>>>>> be) 
>>>>>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
>>>>>> writes,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such 
>>>>>> resolute reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with 
>>>>>> which 
>>>>>> the spirit has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently 
>>>>>> in 
>>>>>> this way for once, *to want* to see differently, is no small 
>>>>>> discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future 
>>>>>> “objectivity”—the latter understood not as “disinterested contemplation” 
>>>>>> (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but rather as the capacity to 
>>>>>> have 
>>>>>> one’s Pro and Contra *in one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, 
>>>>>> so that one knows how to make precisely the *difference* in 
>>>>>> perspectives and affective interpretations useful for knowledge. (
>>>>>> *GM* III, 12)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy 
>>>>>> at least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>>>>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal 
>>>>>> the 
>>>>>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
>>>>>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
>>>>>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
>>>>>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of 
>>>>>> others, 
>>>>>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
>>>>>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
>>>>>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a 
>>>>>> positive 
>>>>>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, 
>>>>>> limited 
>>>>>> cognitive agent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly 
>>>>>> not with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many 
>>>>>> perspective 
>>>>>> of the One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure 
>>>>>> relativism, which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting 
>>>>>> from 
>>>>>> indubitable things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as 
>>>>>> the 
>>>>>> text above suggested a “revised conception” of objective. 
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical 
>>>>>> truth), and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by 
>>>>>> incompleteness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different 
>>>>>> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from 
>>>>>> different 
>>>>>> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive.  This goes 
>>>>>> along 
>>>>>> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder.  I think he 
>>>>>> equated system builders with those who took their perspective to be the 
>>>>>> only one.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Brent
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nietzsche  is famous for two quotes:
>>>>>
>>>>> *God is dead!*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, he said that. But I think he was talking about Santa Klauss-like 
>>>>> notion of God, not about the Neoplatonic conception of God.
>>>>>
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>> *What is the Neoplatonic concept of God and how does it differ from 
>>>> Spinoza's concept, which IIUC, is some sort of pantheistic monismt? TIA, 
>>>> AG 
>>>> *
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Actually, Spinoza is often compared to Neoplatonism, and nobody doubt 
>>>> that his work is influenced by Neoplatonism. I just come back (two weeks 
>>>> ago) of a colloquium in logic and metaphysics where Spinoza was disced a 
>>>> lot. Spinoza describes substance as being self sustained entity, and seems 
>>>> to distinguish from Aristotle primary matter, so that his conception of 
>>>> reality is often described as neutral monism. That being said, his 
>>>> substance is still very Aristotelian, and not much like something in a 
>>>> dream or video games. But then, that is not entirely clear in Plotinus too 
>>>> (by some aspect, mechanism go farer than Plotinus, at least for the 
>>>> motivation).
>>>>
>>>> The “god” of neoplatonism is the ONE, which is though as non 
>>>> describable, non definable, and responsible for the Plato world’s of 
>>>> ideas, 
>>>> and then for the soul, and eventually for matter which is defined 
>>>> negatively by what god (the one) is unable to determine. Matter is when 
>>>> god 
>>>> lose control, and is typically associate with evil in the (neo)platonic 
>>>> tradition. You can compare the ONE with the class of all sets, or with the 
>>>> “everything” (if that exists). Plotinus argue that it is not a being, it 
>>>> is 
>>>> only responsible for all beings, but it is out of the reality (somehow, 
>>>> the 
>>>> God of Plotinus do not exist!). 
>>>>
>>>> With mechanism, the notion of arithmetical truth plays the role of God 
>>>> (it is non definable, and responsible for all provabilities and 
>>>> computability’s notion, including the knower/soul, consciousness, and 
>>>> eventually matter).
>>>>
>>>> You might read my PDF on Plotinus, on my URL (on the front page) for 
>>>> more on this.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>
>>> *Truthfully, these Neoplatonic gods, inclusive of Spinoza, seem pretty 
>>> bor-ing and IMO don't add anything to our knowledge of the Cosmos. OTOH, 
>>> Jesus is dramatic but the overall Judao-Christian idea of God seems pretty 
>>> dumb. This "God" is inconsistent in His behavior and only a delusional fool 
>>> would trust Him. AG *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If you are interested in the cosmos, you can study cosmology. This 
>>> assumes some cosmos, but is neutral on its nature.
>>> But if you are interested in the fundamental science (metaphysics, 
>>> theology) then it is a different domain. 
>>>
>>
>> *These fields are quite distinct from "fundamental science”. *
>>
>>
>> Only since 529. Only because theology has been stolen to the academy to 
>> be used as an oppression instrument by pseudo-politics and states.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*.
>>
>>
>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes 
>> were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the 
>> made “stealing” was made in 1248.
>>
>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with 
>>> Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
>>> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
>>>
>>
>> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG *
>>
>>
>>
>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
>> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised sense). 
>> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness 
>> (or you can assume it outright). 
>>
>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we do 
>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on 
>> the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any evidences.
>>
>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in 
>> place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
>>
>
> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to 
> some existing "universal machine" doing anything? As for physicists being 
> materialists in the sense of believing there is nothing underlying matter 
> as its cause, I have never heard that position articulated by any 
> physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *
>

*If your goal is/was to explain consciousness, and believe in mechanism and 
the digital substitution you've described above -- which seems to be the 
case -- then you've gotten your explanation of consciousness and it's 
nothing more than the conventional expectation of materialists. AG *

>
>
>> Non-mechanism assumes actual infinities in nature, and is inconsistent 
>> with Darwinism, molecular biology, thermodynamic, quantum mechanics. 
>>
>> If the logic of matter (Z1*) extracted from the universal machine 
>> structure was violating the empirical physical reality, that would be 
>> extraordinary, but, thanks to QM, it fits better with the facts than 
>> materialism, which has never succeeded nor even propose an experimental 
>> test.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> The god of Plato and the neoplatonist is by definition the fundamental 
>>> reality. 
>>>
>>
>> *I read some Plato as an undergraduate. Don't recall any "god" in his 
>> writings, *
>>
>>
>> He uses the term God. But Plato’s God is simply the truth that we search, 
>> with the understanding it is above us. Plato identified it at some point 
>> with the “world of ideas”, but the neoplatonist will consider that the 
>> world of ideas emanates from some absolute and non describable truth. With 
>> Mechanism, the arithmetical truth is enough (and at some point, even a 
>> quite tiny part of it will be enough, but in a non provable way).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *or from any source that it defines "fundamental reality". AG *
>>
>>
>> Many scholars agree on this. See the little book by Hirschberger for 
>> example.
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>> Today most christians are materialist, and, as I said, materialism is 
>>> incompatible with mechanism (in a testable way).
>>> But before 529, many educated christians were still more platonism than 
>>> Aristotelian, which are dogmatic on (primitive) matter.
>>>
>>> For a neoplatonist, christianism and atheism is very much alike.
>>>
>>
>> *Then the neoplatonists are totally misinformed and unworthy of trust. AG*
>>
>>
>> Not at all. It is obvious that strong-atheists (non agnostic atheism) 
>> always defend the same conception of God than the christians (even if it is 
>> just to deny it), and have the same belief in the second God of Aristotle 
>> (parity matter). 
>>
>> And the strong-atheists helps a lot the christians in bashing the 
>> scientific theology of the greeks. Stron-atheism is really basically the 
>> same as christianity: it is materialism. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Same conception of god 
>>>
>>
>> *No way! Christians believe in a personal god who came to Earth to redeem 
>> their sins, a form of theism, and atheists don't believe in any god, *
>>
>>
>> But then conclude that there is no god at all, and that the notion of God 
>> available is only the christian one.
>>
>> When we say that God cannot be omniscient (for pure logical reason), the 
>> atheists replies by saying that we cannot change the definition. They would 
>> have said that Earth does not exist when it was discovered that it is 
>> round! Of course, in science we change the definition *all the time*.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *but for you their beliefs are the same? How ridiculous this is! AG*
>>
>>
>> Same belief in Matter (which is the God incompatible with Mechanism).
>> Same belief that God = the Christian God only (total oversight of a 
>> millenium of scientific theology!).
>>
>> They don’t have the same belief in God, but they share the same 
>> definition (curiously enough). Then, they do share the same belief in the 
>> creation.
>>
>> In the Aristotelian view, Mechanism is super-atheists: no Creator, no 
>> Creation.
>>
>> In the Plationcian view, Mechanism is super-religious: only God exist 
>> (arithmetical truth), the rest emerges from it from internal indexical 
>> (given by the logic of self-reference). 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> (even if the atheist uses it only to deny it), and same dogmatic attitude 
>>> for the existence of some matter not reducible to immaterial notions (like 
>>> in mathematics).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
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