> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, [email protected] wrote: > > > > On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> SNIP >> >> >>> No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG. >> >> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes >> were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the >> made “stealing” was made in 1248. >> >> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test >> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. Physics >> seems to NOT be the fundamental science. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with >>> Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its >>> appearance comes from something else, non physical. >>> >>> Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and Materialism, >>> and why are they incompatible? AG >> >> >> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the physical >> functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised sense). To be >> “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness (or you >> can assume it outright). >> >> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot >> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that >> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation >> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). >> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a >> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we do >> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal machine >> (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a >> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. >> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on >> the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any evidences. >> >> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in >> place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of >> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. >> >> Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to >> some existing "universal machine" doing anything? > You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the > existence of a universal machine. > > You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism implies > we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need mechanism to be > true for your theory to be viable.
I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain Digital transplantation. Yes. I don’t claim it is true. I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without collapse). > But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going > further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of > materialism. AG No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal Dovetailer) step by step. Bruno > > The existence of such machine is already a theorem in any Turing-complete > theory with a bit of induction. It is feature of the arithmetical reality. >> As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is >> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position >> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. > You are right. My conclusion has never been problematical with any > physicists. Only metaphysician or theologian who want to assume the existence > of a primary physical universe have a problem with this. My “enemy” are > pseudo-religious believers for whom physicalism is a dogma. They are never > physicists. The physicists are usually aware that the whole story on matter > is not yet told, and that the foundation of physics are still problematical. > Only those who believe they know have such dogma. > > Bruno >> AG >> >> Non-mechanism assumes actual infinities in nature, and is inconsistent with >> Darwinism, molecular biology, thermodynamic, quantum mechanics. >> >> If the logic of matter (Z1*) extracted from the universal machine structure >> was violating the empirical physical reality, that would be extraordinary, >> but, thanks to QM, it fits better with the facts than materialism, which has >> never succeeded nor even propose an experimental test. >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> The god of Plato and the neoplatonist is by definition the fundamental >>> reality. >>> >>> I read some Plato as an undergraduate. Don't recall any "god" in his >>> writings, >> >> He uses the term God. But Plato’s God is simply the truth that we search, >> with the understanding it is above us. Plato identified it at some point >> with the “world of ideas”, but the neoplatonist will consider that the world >> of ideas emanates from some absolute and non describable truth. With >> Mechanism, the arithmetical truth is enough (and at some point, even a quite >> tiny part of it will be enough, but in a non provable way). >> >> >> >>> or from any source that it defines "fundamental reality". AG >> >> Many scholars agree on this. See the little book by Hirschberger for example. >> >> >> >>> >>> Today most christians are materialist, and, as I said, materialism is >>> incompatible with mechanism (in a testable way). >>> But before 529, many educated christians were still more platonism than >>> Aristotelian, which are dogmatic on (primitive) matter. >>> >>> For a neoplatonist, christianism and atheism is very much alike. >>> >>> Then the neoplatonists are totally misinformed and unworthy of trust. AG >> >> Not at all. It is obvious that strong-atheists (non agnostic atheism) always >> defend the same conception of God than the christians (even if it is just to >> deny it), and have the same belief in the second God of Aristotle (parity >> matter). >> >> And the strong-atheists helps a lot the christians in bashing the scientific >> theology of the greeks. Stron-atheism is really basically the same as >> christianity: it is materialism. >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Same conception of god >>> >>> No way! Christians believe in a personal god who came to Earth to redeem >>> their sins, a form of theism, and atheists don't believe in any god, >> >> But then conclude that there is no god at all, and that the notion of God >> available is only the christian one. >> >> When we say that God cannot be omniscient (for pure logical reason), the >> atheists replies by saying that we cannot change the definition. They would >> have said that Earth does not exist when it was discovered that it is round! >> Of course, in science we change the definition *all the time*. >> >> >> >> >>> but for you their beliefs are the same? How ridiculous this is! AG >> >> Same belief in Matter (which is the God incompatible with Mechanism). >> Same belief that God = the Christian God only (total oversight of a >> millenium of scientific theology!). >> >> They don’t have the same belief in God, but they share the same definition >> (curiously enough). Then, they do share the same belief in the creation. >> >> In the Aristotelian view, Mechanism is super-atheists: no Creator, no >> Creation. >> >> In the Plationcian view, Mechanism is super-religious: only God exist >> (arithmetical truth), the rest emerges from it from internal indexical >> (given by the logic of self-reference). >> >> Bruno >> >> >>> >>> (even if the atheist uses it only to deny it), and same dogmatic attitude >>> for the existence of some matter not reducible to immaterial notions (like >>> in mathematics). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] <>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] <>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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