On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 1:12:35 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 10:27:29 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, [email protected] wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> SNIP >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification >>>>> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where >>>>> unfortunately >>>>> the made “stealing” was made in 1248. >>>>> >>>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test >>>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. >>>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible >>>>>> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its >>>>>> appearance comes from something else, non physical. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and >>>>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG * >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the >>>>> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised >>>>> sense). >>>>> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness >>>>> (or you can assume it outright). >>>>> >>>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot >>>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that >>>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a >>>>> computation >>>>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). >>>>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a >>>>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we >>>>> do >>>>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal >>>>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a >>>>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. >>>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains >>>>> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any >>>>> evidences. >>>>> >>>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer >>>>> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of >>>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, >>>> to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?* >>>> >>>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the >>>> existence of a universal machine. >>>> >>> >>> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism >>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need >>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. * >>> >>> >>> >>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain >>> Digital transplantation. Yes. >>> >>> I don’t claim it is true. >>> >>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it >>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without >>> collapse). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without >>> going further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation >>> of materialism. AG* >>> >>> >>> >>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and >>> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the >>> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. >>> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal >>> Dovetailer) step by step. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >> >> The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, >> Philip Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs >> *experientialities* (not *infinities)*. >> >> >> Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, >> if we want keep Mechanism. >> >> Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind, needs experientialities, and >> that is provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, >> (true opinion) refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes >> implicitly a form of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, >> for machines. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> > > > Whether "Matter needs infinities" is something I think many physicists > today are right about: *It isn't the case.* > > Max Tegmark says this emphatically. (Infinities are "ruining physics", he > says.) Maybe a rare instance where I think he may be right. > > - pt >
BTW, I still think that the Universal Dovetailer is close to a model by Peter Wegner and Dina Goldin (the Persistent Turing Machine). http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dqg/papers/strong-cct.pdf - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
