> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, [email protected] <> wrote: >>> >>> >>> SNIP >>> >>> >>>> No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG. >>> >>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes >>> were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the >>> made “stealing” was made in 1248. >>> >>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test >>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. >>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with >>>> Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its >>>> appearance comes from something else, non physical. >>>> >>>> Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and >>>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG >>> >>> >>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the physical >>> functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised sense). To be >>> “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness (or you >>> can assume it outright). >>> >>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot >>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that >>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation >>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). >>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a >>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we do >>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal >>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a >>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. >>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on >>> the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any evidences. >>> >>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in >>> place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of >>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. >>> >>> Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to >>> some existing "universal machine" doing anything? >> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the >> existence of a universal machine. >> >> You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism implies >> we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need mechanism to be >> true for your theory to be viable. > > > I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain Digital > transplantation. Yes. > > I don’t claim it is true. > > I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it > imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without > collapse). > > > > > >> But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going >> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of >> materialism. AG > > > No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and > Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the > observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. > We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal > Dovetailer) step by step. > > Bruno > > > > The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, Philip > Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs > experientialities (not infinities).
Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, if we want keep Mechanism. Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind, needs experientialities, and that is provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, (true opinion) refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes implicitly a form of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, for machines. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
