On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 10:27:29 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote: >>> >>> >>> SNIP >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*. >>>> >>>> >>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification >>>> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where >>>> unfortunately >>>> the made “stealing” was made in 1248. >>>> >>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test >>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. >>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible >>>>> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its >>>>> appearance comes from something else, non physical. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and >>>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the >>>> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised >>>> sense). >>>> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness >>>> (or you can assume it outright). >>>> >>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot >>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that >>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation >>>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). >>>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a >>>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we >>>> do >>>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal >>>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a >>>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. >>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains >>>> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any >>>> evidences. >>>> >>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer >>>> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of >>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. >>>> >>> >>> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, >>> to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?* >>> >>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the >>> existence of a universal machine. >>> >> >> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism >> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need >> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. * >> >> >> >> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain >> Digital transplantation. Yes. >> >> I don’t claim it is true. >> >> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it >> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without >> collapse). >> >> >> >> >> >> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without >> going further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation >> of materialism. AG* >> >> >> >> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and >> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the >> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. >> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal >> Dovetailer) step by step. >> >> Bruno >> >> > > The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, > Philip Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs > *experientialities* (not *infinities)*. > > > Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, > if we want keep Mechanism. > > Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind, needs experientialities, and > that is provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, > (true opinion) refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes > implicitly a form of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, > for machines. > > Bruno > > >
Whether "Matter needs infinities" is something I think many physicists today are right about: *It isn't the case.* Max Tegmark says this emphatically. (Infinities are "ruining physics", he says.) Maybe a rare instance where I think he may be right. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
