On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 10:27:29 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> >>> SNIP >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*. >>>> >>>> >>>> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification >>>> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where >>>> unfortunately >>>> the made “stealing” was made in 1248. >>>> >>>> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test >>>> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. >>>> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible >>>>> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its >>>>> appearance comes from something else, non physical. >>>>> >>>> >>>> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and >>>> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG * >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the >>>> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised >>>> sense). >>>> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness >>>> (or you can assume it outright). >>>> >>>> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot >>>> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that >>>> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation >>>> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). >>>> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a >>>> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we >>>> do >>>> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal >>>> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a >>>> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. >>>> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains >>>> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any >>>> evidences. >>>> >>>> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer >>>> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of >>>> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. >>>> >>> >>> *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, >>> to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?* >>> >>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the >>> existence of a universal machine. >>> >> >> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism >> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need >> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. * >> >> >> >> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain >> Digital transplantation. Yes. >> >> I don’t claim it is true. >> >> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it >> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without >> collapse). >> >> >> >> >> >> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without >> going further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation >> of materialism. AG* >> >> >> >> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and >> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the >> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. >> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal >> Dovetailer) step by step. >> >> Bruno >> >> > > The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, > Philip Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs > *experientialities* (not *infinities)*. > > > Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, > if we want keep Mechanism. > > Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind, needs experientialities, and > that is provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, > (true opinion) refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes > implicitly a form of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, > for machines. > > Bruno > > >
Whether "Matter needs infinities" is something I think many physicists today are right about: *It isn't the case.* Max Tegmark says this emphatically. (Infinities are "ruining physics", he says.) Maybe a rare instance where I think he may be right. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
