> On 22 Dec 2018, at 18:59, [email protected] wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 12:18:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 20 Dec 2018, at 16:35, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 12:46:06 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 19 Dec 2018, at 16:52, [email protected] <> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 12:01:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> On 18 Dec 2018, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <>> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 5:42 PM <[email protected] <>> wrote:
> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
> 
> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. We 
> know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there will 
> be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation of 
> theorems.
> 
> Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic 
> theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG
> 
> Such theories of physics are not axiomatic theories. The things you referred 
> to are broad principles, not axioms.
> 
> That is right. Most theories in math and physics are not axiomatic.
> 
> Concerning physics, nonsense! There's no difference between "the general 
> principles" defining quantum mechanics and SR, and the "axioms" defining 
> these theories. In SR, the genius of Einstein in 1905 was to put the theory 
> on an axiomatic basis which rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant. AG
> 
> I guess you are using the term “axiomatic” in a more general sense that most 
> logicians use that term.
> 
> An "axiom" is any statement one assumes to be true. AG
> 
> That is a general meaning in general philosophy. In logic an axiom is just a 
> formula, or even a machine, and has nothing to do with truth a priori.
> 
> IMO, your comment, while possibly true in a technical sense, is just 
> obfuscating BS. For example, for non relativistic QM, we assume 
> Schroedinger's equation is "true", or correctly represents how the wf 
> evolves. Give me a break. AG 

The whole point of doing metaphysics or theology with the scientific attitude 
would consist in understanding that this kind of nuance and definition are not 
obfuscating anything. On the contrary, they help to be more clear, and to 
prevent the use of metaphysical biases.

When doing physics, we can assume informally that the SWE is correct, but when 
doing Mechanist metaphysics, we can’t, and this is just an example, so it helps 
to use the terms with they standard meaning in science, and not with imprecise 
meanings which usually only hides the (open) problems.



> I know only Carnap and Bunge to have attempted axiomatic (in the stricter) 
> logician sense for physics.
> 
> Absent a Theory of Everything, there is no possible axiomatic structure "for 
> physics". AG 
> 
> They failed,
> 
> It was a project doomed to failure because there is no such thing as a 
> general theory of physics for which it could be applied. AG 
> 
> Not yet. The problem of physics is that its meaning/semantics is still not 
> abstracted from some metaphysical commitment.
> By separating science and religion, physics tends to be confused with 
> metaphysics. Some posts in this list confirms this.  
> 
> Most physicists are not confused as you allege.

I agree. That is why I insist that there is no problem with physics or with 
physicists. I make clear that the problem is with metaphysics. The Aristotelian 
metaphysics is wrong. Now, some people are good in physics, but are not even 
aware that the confusion between physics and metaphysics ïs* the main axiom of 
the Aristotelian theology (with or without an important or trivial notion of 
first god, matter being the second god, but still the main one for the 
aristotelians (believer in primary matter, or physicalists).

The problem is not physics, but physicalism; when we assume the Mechanist 
hypothesis.





> IMO, this line of discussion is just an effort to create strawmen. AG 


No. It is fact that the God/Non-God debate hides the original question of 
scientific theology: is there a universe existing fundamentally, in need to be 
assumed or in need of faith (like the Aristotelian think), or is the physical 
universe a symptom of a deeper non physical reality (like Pythagorus, Plato, …).

Physics is neutral on this; but physicalism is the Aristotelian theological 
axiom. No problem, unless it used as a dogma for not testing simpler theories.

Mechanism works. Physicalism do not, at least with Mechanism.

Mechanism explains why there is an apparent universe, but also why its 
mathematics split into a sharable theory of sharable quanta, and a partially 
sharable theory of non sharable quanta and subjective impressions.

Physicalist usually just eliminate consciousness, and use simplistic identity 
thesis to make prediction. The problem is that physics + mechanism simply 
cannot work. 

Bruno



> Before we get serious on this, axiomatic cannot be used in physics, and even 
> in physicalist metaphysics. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>  
> but I think this should be pursued, as it will help for the type of 
> consideration we have here, but that is a difficult task. Einstein was using 
> the spirit of axiomatic thinking in SR, OK.
>  
> Not merely "spirit", but concrete results. Einstein was able to derive the 
> Lorentz transformation from his two postulates or axioms; namely, the 
> Principle of Relativity and the invariance of the SoL for inertial frames, 
> and in the process rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant.  AG
> 
> But like Euclid, he remains “intuitive” for the math part.
> 
> Not merely intuitive, but concrete math results! See above. AG 
> 
> Same situation prevails for QM as far as axioms are concerned, but here 
> there's nothing intuitive!  For wave mechanics, there are about 4 or 5 
> postulates or axioms pulled out of a hat, from which the consequences follow. 
> For Feynman's Path Integral model, there are 3 postulates, which have already 
> been posted. AG
> 
> Minkowski axiomatic is more like the use in logic, but then it is no more 
> physics. The difficulty to axiomatic physics is … the nature of what we man 
> by “universe”, or by a physical reality, or even a physical experimental 
> device. We work with our intuitive model of this, for good practical reasons.
> 
> Nothing intuitive about one of our best physics theory, QM, AG 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ...
> 
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