On Sunday, December 23, 2018 at 10:45:35 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 22 Dec 2018, at 18:59, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 12:18:33 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 20 Dec 2018, at 16:35, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 12:46:06 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Dec 2018, at 16:52, [email protected] wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 12:01:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 18 Dec 2018, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 5:42 PM <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote: >> >> >> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. >> We know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there >> will be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation >> of theorems. >> >> >> *Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic >> theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG* >> >> >> Such theories of physics are not axiomatic theories. The things you >> referred to are broad principles, not axioms. >> >> >> That is right. Most theories in math and physics are not axiomatic. >> >> >> *Concerning physics, nonsense! There's no difference between "the general >> principles" defining quantum mechanics and SR, and the "axioms" defining >> these theories. In SR, the genius of Einstein in 1905 was to put the theory >> on an axiomatic basis which rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant. AG* >> >> >> I guess you are using the term “axiomatic” in a more general sense that >> most logicians use that term. >> >> >> *An "axiom" is any statement one assumes to be true. AG* >> >> >> That is a general meaning in general philosophy. In logic an axiom is >> just a formula, or even a machine, and has nothing to do with truth a >> priori. >> > > > *IMO, your comment, while possibly true in a technical sense, is just > obfuscating BS. For example, for non relativistic QM, we assume > Schroedinger's equation is "true", or correctly represents how the wf > evolves. Give me a break. AG * > > > The whole point of doing metaphysics or theology with the scientific > attitude would consist in understanding that this kind of nuance and > definition are not obfuscating anything. On the contrary, they help to be > more clear, and to prevent the use of metaphysical biases. > > When doing physics, we can assume informally that the SWE is correct, but > when doing Mechanist metaphysics, we can’t, and this is just an example, so > it helps to use the terms with they standard meaning in science, and not > with imprecise meanings which usually only hides the (open) problems. > > > > I know only Carnap and Bunge to have attempted axiomatic (in the stricter) >> logician sense for physics. >> >> >> >> *Absent a Theory of Everything, there is no possible axiomatic structure >> "for physics". AG * >> >> They failed, >> >> >> >> *It was a project doomed to failure because there is no such thing as a >> general theory of physics for which it could be applied. AG * >> >> >> Not yet. The problem of physics is that its meaning/semantics is still >> not abstracted from some metaphysical commitment. >> By separating science and religion, physics tends to be confused with >> metaphysics. Some posts in this list confirms this. >> > > *Most physicists are not confused as you allege. * > > > I agree. That is why I insist that there is no problem with physics or > with physicists. I make clear that the problem is with metaphysics. The > Aristotelian metaphysics is wrong. Now, some people are good in physics, > but are not even aware that the confusion between physics and metaphysics > ïs* the main axiom of the Aristotelian theology (with or without an > important or trivial notion of first god, matter being the second god, but > still the main one for the aristotelians (believer in primary matter, or > physicalists). > > The problem is not physics, but physicalism; when we assume the Mechanist > hypothesis. > > > > > > *IMO, this line of discussion is just an effort to create strawmen. AG * > > > > No. It is fact that the God/Non-God debate hides the original question of > scientific theology: is there a universe existing fundamentally, in need to > be assumed or in need of faith (like the Aristotelian think), or is the > physical universe a symptom of a deeper non physical reality (like > Pythagorus, Plato, …). > > Physics is neutral on this; but physicalism is the Aristotelian > theological axiom. No problem, unless it used as a dogma for not testing > simpler theories. > > Mechanism works. Physicalism do not, at least with Mechanism. > > Mechanism explains why there is an apparent universe, but also why its > mathematics split into a sharable theory of sharable quanta, and a > partially sharable theory of non sharable quanta and subjective impressions. > > Physicalist usually just eliminate consciousness, and use simplistic > identity thesis to make prediction. The problem is that physics + mechanism > simply cannot work. > > Bruno > > >
There is a problem with some (many?) physicists - at least some ones who write for general science-reading audiences: They talk of mathematical entities of theories of physics as if they were reality. They are a type of anti-materialists. (I cringe whenever Tegmark talks.) - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
