> On 19 Dec 2018, at 16:52, [email protected] wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 19, 2018 at 12:01:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Dec 2018, at 07:57, Bruce Kellett <[email protected] <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 5:42 PM <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote:
>> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> 
>> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. We 
>> know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there will 
>> be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation of 
>> theorems.
>> 
>> Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic 
>> theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG
>> 
>> Such theories of physics are not axiomatic theories. The things you referred 
>> to are broad principles, not axioms.
> 
> That is right. Most theories in math and physics are not axiomatic.
> 
> Concerning physics, nonsense! There's no difference between "the general 
> principles" defining quantum mechanics and SR, and the "axioms" defining 
> these theories. In SR, the genius of Einstein in 1905 was to put the theory 
> on an axiomatic basis which rendered Lorentz's ether theory irrelevant. AG

I guess you are using the term “axiomatic” in a more general sense that most 
logicians use that term. I know only Carnap and Bunge to have attempted 
axiomatic (in the stricter) logician sense for physics. They failed, but I 
think this should be pursued, as it will help for the type of consideration we 
have here, but that is a difficult task. Einstein was using the spirit of 
axiomatic thinking in SR, OK. But like Euclid, he remains “intuitive” for the 
math part. Minkowski axiomatic is more like the use in logic, but then it is no 
more physics. The difficulty to axiomatic physics is … the nature of what we 
man by “universe”, or by a physical reality, or even a physical experimental 
device. We work with our intuitive model of this, for good practical reasons.

Bruno





> 
> The same for mathematical logic: where formal axiomatic are the subject 
> matter, but all proofs are given informally (with the notable exception of 
> principle mathematica). 
> 
> Now, if we formalise a bit of quantum mechanics, we get quickly a theory rich 
> enough to define universal machine or numbers, so QM, when seen formally, is 
> incomplete for arithmetic. That does not mean that it is incomplete for 
> physics, a notion which is also not very well defined. For SR? It will 
> depends largely how we formalise it.
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
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