> On 17 Dec 2018, at 21:33, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 1:25:27 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 17 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, December 17, 2018 at 3:58:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> Mathematics is not philosophy. No need to assume a Platonic realm. You 
>> assume only things like A->(B->A), or x + 0 = x, etc. 
>> 
>> 
>> In the order of things I assume:
>> 
>> 1. I am conscious.
> 
> You don’t need to assume it, nor can you, as it is not a formalisable notion. 
> It is close to self-consistency, which, despite being true on PA makes PA 
> inconsistent if assumed, or makes it into a new machine, where the same 
> choice occur.
> 
> Now, I know what you mean.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 2. Matter is all there is.
> 
> No problem with such axiom, but you will need a non mechanist theory of mind. 
> And also some more explanation of what is matter, and how you derive 2+2=4 in 
> the theory.
> 
> And predict some old facts with less, or some new facts, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> ...
>> >=3. "x+0=x” 
> 
> The optimist believes that x+0 is slightly bigger than x, and the pessimist 
> believes that x+0 is slightly smaller than x. 
> But they are both deluded and confuse 0 with an infinitesimal.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On matter and mechanism: So-called "mechanistic" materialism is considered to 
> be wrong by the new "experiential" (panpsychical) materialists. Their new 
> picture of matter has
>   
> 
>        φ-states   (physical [including chemical and biological] states)
>     + ψ-states   (psychical [or experiential] states)
> 
> 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/

With mechanism, phi and psi state are explained in a testable way by assuming 
relations on which we all agree, both on the theories and the intuitive meaning 
(despite knowing we cannot define it).

That is not the case for term like matter, consciousness, etc.

Bruno 



> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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