On Saturday, December 22, 2018 at 3:53:36 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 21 Dec 2018, at 05:44, Jason Resch <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:28 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:07 PM Jason Resch <[email protected] >> <javascript:>> wrote: >> >>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:11 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected] >>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:49 AM Jason Resch <[email protected] >>>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Do you believe other locations in space exist? >>>>> >>>> >>>> They exist, but there is no sense in which they are simultaneous with >>>> my existence. >>>> >>> >>> There are certain senses in which you could, but I mostly agree (as they >>> are not objective). >>> >>> >>>> They exist because events at other locations in my past light cone can >>>> affect me, and I can affect events at other locations in my future light >>>> cone. >>>> >>> >>> Okay, no problem with this. >>> >>> >>>> Do you believe other locations in time exist? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I believe that I have a past, and will have a future, but I do not >>>> believe that these exist in my present. Such an idea is clearly a >>>> linguistic confusion. >>>> >>> >>> I agree. >>> >>> >>>> (I answer yes to both questions, that is all I mean by block time -- >>>>> that there is no privileged part of space time blessed with the property >>>>> of >>>>> existence). >>>>> >>>> >>>> The present is all that you can know exists. All else is idle >>>> speculation. >>>> >>> >>> But you just said there is no such thing as the present (since there is >>> no objective notion of simultaneity) >>> >> >> I have never said that there is no such thing as the present. All I have >> said is that the notion of a space-like hyper-surface of simultaneity is >> not an objective notion. >> > > Okay I agree with this. I happen to take this as evidence that the > "passage of time" is also not an objective notion. What do you think about > the passage of time, is it purely a subjective notion in your view? > > >> The print moment exists now for ev very one of us individually. >> > >> Of course, you can construct imaginary theories in which unicorns, >>>> fairies, and Hogwarts Castle exist, but you would not have any evidence >>>> for >>>> any of these. >>>> >>> >>> You just said you have evidence for the existence of objects in your >>> past light cone. Why presume that they would disappear from existence? >>> What is the motivation/justification for such an idea? >>> >> >> I have no evidence that they exist now, since all I am currently aware of >> is the record of their past existence as it is present to me now. The >> evidence is that they existed in the past. Why is that not sufficient? I >> tend not to believe in things, like fairies, for which I have no current >> evidence. >> > > This seems to be a trend that explains all aspects of your philosophy. > For example, rejecting many-worlds, rejecting other universes, rejecting > other points in time, rejecting mathematical objects. It's based purely on > what you can see. It is a theory of minimizing the number of objects in > reality. But to me this is not a correct application of Occam, which was > about simplifying theories by reducing their unnecessary assumptions, > rather than reducing the ontologies of those theories. > > So by lobbing off the assumption that some points in the past stop > existing, you get a larger universe, more points in spacetime exist (but > this is simpler, as you don't have to add a theory of how different events > come into or out of existence), or with many-worlds, if you drop the > collapse postulate, you get the same predictions, and a simpler theory (but > a huge number of unseen histories). With this different philosophy/value > system I don't think we will ever agree on what makes for a better theory, > for in all these cases that we disagree, it comes down to my preference for > a simpler theory, and your preference for a simpler ontology. > > > I would say that with Mechanism we get both a simple ontology (just 0, 1, > 2, …) and a simple theory, just the two SK axioms, or the very elementary > RA. Yet, we get a extremely rich phenomenology, unboundedly complex with > sharable and non sharable truth, with infinitely many histories and > cosmos/multivers, etc, and with many persons and their experiences (no risk > to sacrifice souls and consciousness). > > Bruno > > >
Arithmetical entities cannot have real (unsimulated*) experiences. Material entities can. * cf. [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unsimulated_sex ] -pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
