> On 21 Dec 2018, at 01:07, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 3:40:53 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote: > On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > Is not 333’s oddness timeless? > > Category error. > > > > On category error: > > I've never understood "category error" [ > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake ]. (Some philosopher I read > about recently gave a talk on the non-existence of category errors. Good.) > > Is 333's oddness timeless? is a perfectly reasonable question. > > To the immaterialist, the answer could be "yes". > To the materialist, the answer could not be "no”.
That makes sense only if the materialist describe how 333 depends on time. But then I suppose he has a different definition than the usual one, and that requires clarification. > > It all depends. > > There is a type of dualists who say 333 is one category (nonphysical) and > time (as in spacetime) is in another category (physical), but this dualism is > just mixed-up confusion to me. And to me to. But I guess you defends a materialist monism. That contradicts Mechanism. > > Gilbert Ryle's initial rendition of "category error" (about mind) stands in > contradiction to Galen Strawson on that topic. The problem with the materialist is that they need to make consciousness into an illusion, and that is already jeopardise by the Cartesian Cogito. As I said, it is easier to explain the illusion of matter to a conscious being (especially if he remembers its dream) than to explain the illusion of consciousness to a piece of matter. Now, once we work in the Digital Mechanist frame, things get clearer and deeper. Bruno > > - pt > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
