On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift <cloud...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I 
>>>> cannot use any ontological commitment other than the term of some 
>>>> arbitrary 
>>>> but fixed universal system. 
>>>>
>>>> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
>>>> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
>>>> work with Mechanism.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> There is no mind|body problem.
>>> Only a language|body problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
>>> third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
>>> soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body problem 
>>> consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
>>> things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by 
>>> Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
>>> rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
>>> true-believer).
>>> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
>>> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
>>> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
>>> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
>>> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
>>> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
>>> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
>>> taken into account.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
>> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
>> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
>> has a updated version of it.
>>
>>
>>
>> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
>> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
>> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, 
>> which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and 
>> constant verification and re-verification. 
>>
>> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
>> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
>> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
>> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
>> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> On "where do atoms come from" I guess *any physicist*  you meet today has 
> as good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>
>
> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except 
> very bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>
> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
> employed must be entirely justified too.
>
>
>
>
>
> On consciousness: 
>
> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
> is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
> psychical features.
>
>
> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
> direction, both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
>
>
>
>
>
> *According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
> have very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain 
> as a whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. 
> This is the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the 
> combination problem, which we will explore below. However, if it can be 
> made sense of, constitutive micropsychism promises an elegant and 
> parsimonious view of nature, with all the richness of nature accounted for 
> in terms of facts at the micro-level.*
>
>
> I am skeptical this can work, and of course, it is incompatible with 
> Digital mechanism. This one explains consciousness in the most standard 
> theological way (Theaetetus), and it explains matter in an entire new way, 
> as number hallucination, which provable exist in arithmetic (once we bet 
> the brain is Turing emulable).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
In any case, one of the "micropsychists"  has a new paper just out:


"According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious entities 
come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together to form a 
single unified consciousness. ..."

*Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information 
Theory*
Hedda Hassel Mørch
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)

https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf

*Abstract*
The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that 
consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ. 
One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality 
problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an 
extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. In this paper, I 
show that this problem is not unique to IIT, but rather derives from a 
trilemma that confronts almost any theory of consciousness. Given most 
theories of consciousness, the following three claims are inconsistent. 
INTRINSICALITY: Consciousness is intrinsic. NON-OVERLAP: Conscious systems 
do not overlap with other conscious systems (a la Unger’s problem of the 
many). REDUCTIONISM: Consciousness is constituted by more fundamental 
properties (as per standard versions of physicalism and Russellian monism). 
In view of this, I will consider whether rejecting INTRINSICALITY is 
necessarily less plausible than rejecting NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM. I 
will also consider whether IIT is necessarily committed to rejecting 
INTRINSICALITY or whether it could also accept solutions that reject 
NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM instead. I will suggest that the best option 
for IIT may be a solution that rejects REDUCTIONISM rather than 
INTRINSICALITY or NON-OVERLAP.


- pt

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