I send again my answer, that I wrote yesterday. All in one post. =========== Hi Philip,
I cannot answer in your text for reason of bad formatting. It looks hard to be sent too. I comment here: when you say: << Matter is everything that we can see, smell, touch, feel and even can't see. >> I am OK with this definition. But when you add << Everything is matter, there isn't anything that isn't matter. >> That means you adopt Aristotle’s metaphysics, which is incompatible with the “Mechanist act of faith”. Indeed, logic makes the Mechanist theory entitling that “seeing, smelling, touching, feeling” are phenomenological number attributes, and explains matter without making it primitive, which means really explain it, instead of populating at the outset. If you believe that matter explains the numbers, you should provide the explanation, and of course, not assume the numbers, or anything Turing-equivalent, in the process. Existing theories in physics do assumes the numbers, and so cannot be used in this context. Bruno ================================= Hi John, > On 15 Feb 2019, at 20:37, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com > <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 1:15 PM Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > > I will do a personal confession: I have never believe in matter, > > Matter doesn't care if you believe in it or not, it will just continue doing > what it does. Assuming it exists. But in that case you have to explain what is primary matter, and how it makes some computations (going through your mind state) in arithmetic more real than others. That assumption makes things more complex, and without any evidence for it. So it looks like making things only more complex without any evidence for it. Assuming matter makes it primitive, without reason. > > > because I have never seen any evidence for it. > > That's OK, I don't think matter has ever seen any evidence for you either. Nor for your consciousness, but you cannot eliminate it, as you say in your critics on Dennett (with which I agree). > > > Matter is like God, > > Matter is nothing like God, one is amenable to the scientific method and one > is not, that is to say one is bullshit and one is not. I should have written “Assumed Matter” or “Primitive Matter”. It is like a creator God, instead of “God made it”, you accept/assume its existence, which is equivalent to abandoning the idea of explains it from simpler principles. It is the common “Aristotle's mistake” of reifying a metaphysical notion, to avoid explains it. To say “because matter is” is not a progress from “because A God made it”. > > > in the sense of the greeks > > Yes in the sense of the ancient Greeks, in other words in the sense of people > with less scientific literacy than a bright fourth grader. No, in theology Wie have regressed a lot, after the theology-science has been stolen by Churches and Tempes to control and manipulate people. Most people are even ignorant of the work of the neopythagorean and the neoplatonist. They ignore that the science of physics, mathematics, and even mathematical logic are all born from that scientific theology of the ancient greeks. It is just that after 529 in Occident, and after1248 (Al Ghazali) in the Middle-East, the field has been made taboo or mocked by people who use dogma instead. > Why oh why do you keep talking about those ignoramuses? Because in theology, to put it roughly, we have imposed inconsistent theories since long. > > > which means that it is something that we have to explain, > > And then we have to explain the explanation and then explain the explanation > of the explanation and then… … and then we explains everything, including the necessary presence of some unexplainable experiences and realms, just from elementary addition and multiplication, without assuming anything more than Mechanism and accepting the standard definitions in the fields of epistemology and ancient theology. Mechanism explains the conscious appearance and the sharable and non sharable part of the physical reality, without committing itself in strong ontological assumption. Bruno ========================================= Hi Brent, > On 15 Feb 2019, at 19:53, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net > <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: > > > > On 2/14/2019 3:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Don’t hesitate to find some argument in favour of primitive materials, but >> in my opinion, this is highly speculative, and never used in physics. > > But the non-material primitive is never used either. Assuming matter! But even a physicist will prefer to assume numbers, as he needs to record the results of its experiment and develop its theory, than to derive the notion of numbers from, say the strings (and not the string *theory*, which assumes some number or equivalent Turing-complete base. > Insofar as I know, no scientist ever worries about what is primitive; I agree. That is the case since 1500 years. Metaphysics/theology have been taken away from science. Instead of obeying to elementary Pltinian-like theology, whose recommend to never mention Its Name in any terrestrial effective matter, we do tolerate the blasphemy all the times. That explains why in the human science we are still in the superstition, idolatry, with a complacency to total lack of rigour. That explains (but not justifies) the Shoah, Rwanda, Wars, and the many lies we are given all the times in the human domain, the medical science included. Science has not yet begun, except somehow in between -500 (Pythagorus) and +500 (Damascius, end of Plato’s Academy in Athen). Science is neutral on metaphysics and theology, *especially* in scientific metaphysics/psychology/theology. You are right, I have never find a paper in physics which assumes ontological matter. Only in philosophy do many people do that assumption, which is not a problem if recognised as such, and not mixed with Digital Mechanism. But the empirical evidences sides more with Mechanism than Materialism. > they only want to find a theory that is consilient, broad in scope, and > correct in predictions. Yes, so let us do that with theology and metaphysics. Bruno =============================================== Hi Brent, > On 15 Feb 2019, at 19:50, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net > <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: > > > > On 2/14/2019 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> On 14 Feb 2019, at 06:44, Brent Meeker <meeke...@verizon.net >>> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 2/12/2019 5:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> If we could knew which machine we are, we could define consciousness, or >>>> at least our personal current consciousness, as it would be defined by the >>>> combinator realising us. But that is impossible, and it defines only >>>> mechanism and the choice we might make for our substitution level. >>> But when we build AI's we will know which machine they are. >>> >> In theory yes, and we can be sure of its theology if the machine is sensibly >> less complex than us. > > I don't understand that. "We" in the collective sense build lots of things > that no one of us understands (e.g. Boeing 747), but "we" understand it. The point is that a machine cannot prove its own consistency, or define its own notion of truth/god, but she *can* prove that IF she is consistent, then she cannot prove its own consistency. At that stage, its living or experience of its inability to prove its consistency can be abductively explained by the fact she *might* be consistent. Something similar happens with soundness, and all its limitation. The key here is that machine can prove their own conditional incompleteness, and experience things (by the qualitative difference brought by the difference of the logic of G ([]p) and S4Grz ([]p & p). For the Boeing 747, even the 787!, machine understand it eventually, it is pure 3p, even if it is 1p-plural, after assuming compuytationalism, but it is entirely explainable in 3p terms. Not so for the proper theology of the machine: the (G* minus G) points on things which have to be above them, when the box “[]” refers to their beliefs (as assumed by mechanism where “[]” describes their correct level of substitution). But all machine can do the theology of the simpler machine, and see “empirically” if that is confirmed, in the experiential (1p) way, and in some first person plural way (1p-plural, locally 3p). > >> But the machine itself will not believe us, or understand this. > > Why not? It can't prove what algorithm it is, but it can know that we > know...so why would it disbelieve us. Tha machine becomes inconsistent if it assumes its consistency (cf Rogers’s sentence). The machine can assume a sort of consistency of its past belief, like PA can add the axioms that PA is consistent, (or that PA is inconsistent) without losing its consistency, but in that case it becomes a new machine, with a similar theology in shape, but a different content/meaning for the box. She has changed her own code (as we do every second instinctively). > >> Then in practice, the machine will transform itself very quickly, > > Wild speculation. We don't "transform ourselves very quickly”. Of course we do. For example, you just change yourself into a new “Brent” with the axiom: I just read Bruno saying “Of course we do.” In a mail from 17 February 2019. You kept your persona identity, because we have define the identity of the person through their inclusive memories. Bruno ============================================== Hi Philip (this is from the thread “Recommend this articles, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end” > On 15 Feb 2019, at 20:43, Philip Thrift <cloudver...@gmail.com > <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 12:01:26 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 15 Feb 2019, at 16:12, Philip Thrift <cloud...@ <>gmail.com >> <http://gmail.com/>> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 5:35:02 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 15 Feb 2019, at 08:25, Philip Thrift <cloud...@ <>gmail.com >>> <http://gmail.com/>> wrote: >>> >>> On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:40:32 PM UTC-6, cdemorsella wrote: >>> Two fascinating (and very different) approaches are presented to derive >>> Quantim Mechanics main practical tool (e.g. Born's rule). Wonder what some >>> of the physicists on here think about this research? >>> >>> I find the argument that no laws is the fundamental law... and that the >>> universe and its laws are emergent guided by subtle mathematical >>> statistical phenomena, at the same time both alluring and annoying.... it >>> is somehow unsatisfactory.... like being served a quite empty plate with >>> nice garnish for dinner. >>> >>> One example of emergence from chaotic conditions is how traffic jams (aka >>> density waves) can emerge from chaotic initial conditions, becoming self >>> re-enforcing within local domains of influence... for those unlucky to be >>> stuck in them. Density wave emergence is seen across scale, for example the >>> spiral arms of galaxies can be explained as giant gravitational pile ups >>> with some fundamentally similar parallels to say a rush hour traffic jam, >>> except on vastly different scales of course and due to other different >>> factors, in the galactic case the emergent effects of a vast number of >>> gravitational inter-actions as stars migrate through these arms on their >>> grand voyages around the galactic core. >>> >>> This paired with the corollary argument that any attempt to discover a >>> fundamental law seems doomed to the infinite regression of then needing to >>> explain what this foundation itself rests upon.... leading to the "it's >>> turtles all the way down" hall of mirrors carnival house... head-banger. >>> >>> Perhaps, as Wheeler argued, the world is a self-synthesizing system, and >>> the seeming order we observe, is emergent... a law without law. >>> >>> Here is the link to the article: >>> >>> https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-born-rule-has-been-derived-from-simple-physical-principles-20190213/ >>> >>> <https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-born-rule-has-been-derived-from-simple-physical-principles-20190213/> >>> >>> >>> >>> One can (sort of) write all "physics" in a couple of equations: the >>> Einstein Field Equation (EFE) and the Standard Model Equation (SME): >>> >>> EFE: >>> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/EinsteinLeiden4.jpg/620px-EinsteinLeiden4.jpg >>> >>> <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/EinsteinLeiden4.jpg/620px-EinsteinLeiden4.jpg> >>> + >>> SME: >>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png >>> >>> <https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png> >>> >>> What caused this particular arrangement of expressions in these to be the >>> "law" of our universe I suppose can be "explained" by it's being one of any >>> number of possible arrangements. >> >> >> The tiny (sigma_1) arithmetical reality contains all “combinations” of all >> programs, and your explanation is a bit like digital physics, where the >> physical universe would be one special universal number, say U. That is >> possible, but this can explain the origin of the physical laws, in a >> coherent way with respect to the mind-body problem (the hard problem of >> consciousness) only in presence of an explanation of why that program U is >> winning, that is how such U can “multiply” you so much in the relative way >> that the laws of physics get stabilised. Arithmetical self-reference >> explains consciousness “easily”, but at the price of forcing us to derive >> the physical laws from any universal machinery. >> The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among others, it is the >> projective border of the universal mind, which is just the mind of the >> universal machine. It is a complex many-dreams structure, and its quantum >> aspects explain why negative amplitude of probability can play a role in >> making the aberrant histories relatively rare, despite them being also in >> that sigma_1 arithmetic. >> >> With mechanism, the idea that there is anything more than the sigma_1 >> arithmetical truth is absolutely undecidable. The sigma_1 truth emulates the >> sigma_n believers for all n, and beyond. If the physics which is in the head >> of the universal numbers departs too much from what we see, it will be time >> to suspect that there is indeed something more. But not only there are no >> evidence for that, but there are strong evidence for the completeness of the >> sigma_1 truth with respect to the metaphysical questions. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> Whatever brand of scientist - physicist, chemist, biologist, even >> psychologist - it seems that they see any theory of whatever is within their >> domain is to be composed of a finite number of sentences (e.g. equations, >> for physicists). > > Yes, like a brain use a finite number of molecules, and mechanism eventually > only assumes the finite number 0, s(0), s(s(0)), …, which actually will be > used to code the finite things we are interested in. > > But the meaning of those things are formalised by infinite structure, like > the model (N, +, x), or like hide that a computable function associate any > number to a number. The understanding of “red” should make you able to > recognise *all* red things. With mechanism, such meaning are captured by > nameable, and non nameable, number relations. > > All theories assumes such potential, phenomenological, infinities. The > concept of understanding is itself infinite, and more or less well captured > by the comprehension axiom in set theories, or the abstraction Operation in > Lambda calculus. Compute science is concerned by the behaviour of finite > entities confronted to finite or infinite entities. > > > > > >> >> To have a theory that is composed of an infinite number of sentences is sort >> of outside of their way of thinking. > > All theories contains an infinite set of sentences. Classical propositional > logic contains as theorem “p -> p”, > “p -> (p -> p)”, “p -> (p -> (p -> p)), etc. Elementary arithmetic contains > infinite propositions: 1+1= 2, 2+2=4, 4+4=8, 8+8=16, etc. That is why we use > variables to say generalities, like Ax(x=x), that is, for all x it is the > case that x = x. Or we use scheme of axioms. > No need to put any ontology on this, with mechanism we need only 0, s(0), … > Mechanism explains, using only the laws of addition and multiplication (and > succession) how finite numbers get able to hallucinate other numbers, and why > some sheaves of hallucination can become persistent and associated to deep > and complex lawful histories. > > I might disagree with you, everyone’s theory is infinite, but what you are > perhaps saying is that at any moment of time, we consult only finite part of > those theories, to figure out some reality we bet on. But that is not unlike > the Turing machine, which consulte only finite portion of its tape, and asks > only a finite number of query to some Oracle. > > F=ma assumes already many infinite theories. Infinite theories are far > simpler to use than finite theories, due especially to the abundance of very > similar types of things, like photons, electro, water molecules, but also > numbers, functions, relations, space, etc. > > Digital Mechanism is a finitisme, not an ultrafinitism, to be clear. It also > an indexical, it concerns your willingness to say yes to a digitalist doctor, > or yes to a digital teleportation experience. I just show that in that case > the mind-body problem reduce to a body illusion problem in arithmetic. It is > more a problem asked in a theory of consciousness than in physics. Here the > theory of consciousness is basically the whole theology of the universal > machine, or the one common to all sound consistent extension of a little one > like PA. PA assumes induction, which we can put already in the phenomenology. > From the putself, we assume only RA(*). > > Bruno > > RA = Robinson’s Arithmetic (often called Q): > > 1) 0 ≠ s(x) > 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) > 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) > 4) x+0 = x > 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) > 6) x*0=0 > 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > An even cuter TOE is (without logic!): > > 1) If A = B and A = C, then B = C > 2) If A = B then AC = BC > 3) If A = B then CA = CB > 4) KAB = A > 5) SABC = AC(BC) > > Both are finite theories, or can be easily viewed as shemes of proposition.. > The second theory is purely equational. We cannot prove that SK = KI in that > theory, but that is not needed in the ontology, where they are indeed > different. > > > Both theories emulate all Löbian machines, which you can define by any > machine believing one of those axioms, + logic, + corresponding axioms of > induction. They are the machines we can interview on the theology, and the > key proper theological proposition, well they can communicate them only > conditionally to the computationalist hypothesis (of course), and some > “dangerous” self-soundness implicit assumption. It is here that there is a > theological trap (consistent in claiming that G* would necessarily apply to > us). > > Bruno > > > > > > I was really talking about every theory considered has a finite > specification. In Robinson Arithmetic (RA) above there are only 7 sentences > listed. Of course an infinite number of sentences can can be produced from > these via rules of the specification. > > One can have the axioms of True Arithmetic (TA): > > A sentence S is an axiom of TA if S is evaluates to be true over the > natural numbers. > > That would be an "infinite" theory. Or better: an infinite “theory”. In the frame of Mechanism, I prefer to consider such necessary infinite, and not recursively enumerable “theory” as kind of model, instead of theory. I consider that a theory has to be effective. Its theorems has to be recursively enumerable, its axioms has to be recursive. The set of all true sentences of any Turing-complete theory is not recursively enumerable, and is better to be seen as a type of model/semantics. Initially I identify words, numbers, machines, finitely presentable thing, code, software/hardware, as opposed to meaning, infinities, models, realities, … Nuances are then brown au fur et à mesure. > > > (Consider a theory of physics that just accumulated all sentences S that > passed an experiment.) That is more like facts, than theorems or potential beliefs of a person. > > > > But also what I am talking about are theories with non-quantitative domains > (are not numerical at all, but are experiential). The experiential (qualitative) domain is obtained from the relation between (fixed point) semantics, but the one I used are intensional fixed point (like in the second recursion theorem) than extensional or denotational one. In particular the modes with “& p” is their definition provide the logic of first person experience, which have a form of knowledge which are not definable, indubitable, not provable, etc. That is possible thanks to incompleteness; despite we will have []p <-> ([]p & p), given that we limit ourselves to correct (souped) machine, and so their G*, or G1*, will prove that equivalence, but the machine concerned itself cannot, and apprehend that type of information in a non numerical, nor even 3p-describable way at all. Incompleteness refute the critics on Theaetetus made by Socrates. Church’s thesis and Gödel’s theorems (and Kleene’s second recursion theorem) rehabilitates Pythagorus and Neoplatonists. > > The Enactive Approach to Qualitative Ontology > https://philarchive.org/archive/PACITT > <https://philarchive.org/archive/PACITT> I can understand you appreciate this, and I can agree with many ideas there, but their qualitative ontology is recovered as experiential. When they say: << The new categories proposed by the authors, then, point towards a qualitative conception of matter, conceived as characterized by a continuous actualization of the virtual, that in natural history proceeds as an underlying impulse towards the actualization of possibilities and tendencies. >>, they just add implicitly the equivalent of a sort of “reduction of the wave”, for having their inaction selecting the histories possible/consistent. They use an implicit ontological commitment in a primarily material conception of reality, which is natural from the 1p view, but is better to be seen as phenomenological, given that logic (incompleteness) imposes that phenomenology for the machines first person logics. Yes, that shows why it is hard for machine to believe that they are machine, and actually the sound machine is correct when saying that its soul (the knower) is not a machine, nor anything definable in any third person way. But incompleteness explains why such feeling is unavoidable, and 1p-true, but 3p-nonsensical. The universal machine, once she accepts enough induction axioms, knows that she has a soul, and knows that her soul is not a machine. All such “enough rich” machine cannot avoid qualities in the ([]p & p) and ([]p & <>t & p) modes of self-reference. With p sigma_1, that gives quantum logics acting as describing alternative measurement result related to the measure 1 on the computations accessible by the mind of the machine in the differentiating consciousness flux in arithmetic. We get a phenomenological reduction of the wave without a need to enact some of them in a reality/computation made more real than others by sheer will. Bruno ========================== Hope this has gone through! Best, Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
