On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 4:42:28 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Mar 2019, at 23:00, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 11:47:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 22:10, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional 
>>> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
>>>
>>>
>>
>> There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
>> applied mathematics
>>
>>
>> Yes. But note that the division we can made there are dependent of the 
>> metaphysics.
>>
>> Then Gödel has shown that we can apply mathematics to metamathematics, 
>> and that a large part of metamathematics is in mathematics, so mathematics 
>> have application in mathematics. But that is obvious through the 
>> representation theorems, and my factors. We can say that the theory of 
>> complex analysis has found extraordinary application in the pure number 
>> theory, like Riemann discovered. 
>>
>> Category theory is born from the discovery of abstract pattern relying 
>> many application of some branch of math to another branch of math. It helps 
>> mathematician to not reinvent the wheel all the time.
>>
>>
>>
>> (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics (PM, P for "Pure") 
>> and Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at *some* 
>> universities.
>>
>>
>> Yes. That has been the root of my problem with some local academician. I 
>> naively stated that I decide to study mathematics because I saw application 
>> of mathematical logic (the second recursion theorem) to biology (like I 
>> have shown in my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”. But I was 
>> told that mathematical logic was taught in the section of Pure Mathematics, 
>> where it was very badly seen to apply mathematics to anything but 
>> mathematics. This illustrates it makes no sense to decide that some part of 
>> math are pure or not.
>>
>> And this is even more true with mechanism.  There is no more an 
>> ontological physical reality, or any gods of that sort (which have never 
>> been tested, actually, except with my work, of course, where the test was 
>> negative for “Matter”). So the fundamental reality becomes mathematical. 
>> And we are pure mathematical object living in a mathematical reality. That 
>> is not entirely correct, because the internal phenomenology, for technical 
>> reason, escapes even the whole of mathematics. So, eventually, the reality 
>> is theological, to be correct. But the theology of the machines is a 
>> theory, which today, is classified in pure mathematics (the logic of 
>> provability). 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what "computing" is.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, even in arithmetic. The universal machine discover that there is a 
>> big difference between being implemented by a nameable “in principle” 
>> universal number, and being implemented by something emerging from an 
>> infinity of computations from the first person points of view. The first 
>> leads to the theory G* (the “scientific theology of the ideally sound 
>> machine”), and the others leads to quantum logic and physics, and the right 
>> one, if mechanism is correct.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
>> scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
>> etc.).
>>
>>
>> And assuming some physical reality. If you do serious metaphysics, it is 
>> better to invoke an ontological commitment only in last ressort. Invoking 
>> an ontological or primary physical universe is like saying “and god made 
>> it”. That does not work. It is wishful thinking, provably if Mechanism is 
>> assumed.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
>> material computers, natural or manmade. 
>>
>>
>> Computation have been discovered in arithmetic, before physics.
>>
>> Of course, the fact that we have cells and brains suggest, once we 
>> understand that a computation is an arithmetical notion,  that the physical 
>> reality too is Turing complete. But with mechanism, to solve the mind-body 
>> problem, you have to derive the physical reality (and its Turing 
>> completeness) from arithmetic. It is nota question of choice.
>>
>> Of course you can say that in your religion, machine cannot have souls, 
>> that you are not a machine, and so you can believe in the fantasy you want. 
>> That is what we do since we have put theology out of science (just to make 
>> it possible for some tyran to exploit people).
>>
>> Or you can try to build a precise non computationalist theory of mind, 
>> and how to test it, in which case the computationalist theory will gives 
>> many hint. Indeed, if some logics the universal machine gives for matter is 
>> contradicted by nature, we do have a precise hint how to transform the 
>> machine theory to get a correct non mechanist theory.
>> Today, such theory does not exist, Nature follows perfectly well 
>> Mechanism,and the theory of apparent matter given by all classical 
>> universal machine,  thanks to QM.  
>>
>> There is no evidence for your metaphysical ontological commitment. Given 
>> that it makes the mind-body problem unsolvable since a long time, and that 
>> mechanism explains consciousness and matter already, up to the infinite 
>> confirmation we must test, like any theory about any reality. We never know 
>> any publicly communicable truth.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> I was a Brown University student 1971-1979 (all 3 degrees: bachelors, 
> masters, Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics).
>
> There is:
>
> Division of Applied Mathematics
> Department of Mathematics
> Department of Philosophy 
>
> Why the word "Division" instead of "Department" came in front  I'm not 
> sure (it divided from the Mathematics department?), but it began at the end 
> of WWII to be a link to US federal government interest in applying 
> mathematics to science. The Division divided :) in 1979, spinning off 
> Department of Computer Science.
>
> The subject of Mathematic Logic (all the incompleteness theorems, etc.) is 
> taught in Department of Philosophy. 
>
>
> Good point for your department of philosophy. Here, it was done in the 
> department of pure mathematics, and it was badly seen to apply logic, even 
> in computer science. 
>
>
>
>
> Still is in 2019 I think. That Department is where the mathematical 
> logicians are.
>
> The general mindset (at the time): Mathematics is the fun stuff, Applied 
> Mathematics is the real stuff. But there is crossover.
>
>
> Such distinction pure/applied can make sense for the curriculum, but does 
> not make any absolute sense, and should not be taken too much seriously. 
> Pure today, applicable tomorrow. There is no crisp frontier.
>
> Philosophy when I was young was marxiste philosophy, and the motto was an 
> apology of USSR, and a bashing against the US, … In that time, not only you 
> could not tabor doubt against materialism in metaphysics, but you could not 
> even critize “dialectical materialism”. The faculty of science was a mix of 
> serious good willing people, and very ignorant and violent persons.
>
> Unlike the flemish part of the university, or unlike the nearby catholic 
> university, philosophers never et with the scientists. Logic, Gödel’s 
> theorem, was considered as pure mathematics only. It was forbidden even for 
> the late department of computer science, hold by physicist, without any 
> mathematicians.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
I am an experiential materialist - matter itself has both informationality 
and experientiality - (like Strawson), and define Codicalism as the 
dialectics of *language* and matter.
- https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/03/02/language-matter-dialectics/

Language includes mathematics and scientific theories - like the Standard 
Model, Einstein Field Equations, etc. They are all "fictionalist". In the 
later case they may be "useful" fictions.

I never quite got into the mood to delve deeply into dialectical 
materialism (Marxism). In economic terms, the dialectics of the welfare 
state (a blending of capitalism and socialism) is enough.

- pt 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to