> On 15 Apr 2019, at 20:28, za_wishy via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hmm... the thing is that what I'm arguing for in the book is that > self-reference is unformalizable,
With mechanism, third-person self-reference is formalisable, and from this we can prove that first person self-reference is not formalisable in the language of the machine concerned, but is “meta-formalisable” by using reference to truth (itself not formalisable). The same occurs for the notion of qualia, consciousness, and many mental and theological attributes. > so there can be no mathematics of self-reference. More than this, > self-reference is not some concept in a theory, but it is us, each and > everyone of us is a form of manifestation of self-reference. Self-reference > is an eternal logical structure that eternally looks-back-at-itself. And this > looking-back-at-itself automatically generates a subjective ontology, an "I > am”. That is good insight, well recovered by the machine about its first person self. It is akin to the inner god of the neoplatonist. > In other words, the very definition of the concept of "existence" is the > looking-back-at-itself of self-reference. That type of existence is phenomenological. With mechanism, we assume only the ntaiutal numbers, (or any terms of any Turing complete theory), then we derive the first person self)-reference, including the physical reality which appears ti be a first person plural notion. The physical reality is partially a subjective phenomenon. > So, existence can only be subjective, so all that can exists is consciousness. I see this as a critics of your theory. It is almost self-defeating. My goal was to understand matter and consciousness from proposition on which (almost) everybody agree, and with mechanism, elementary arithmetic is enough. > I talk in the book how the looking-back-at-itself implies 3 properties: > identity (self-reference is itself, x=x), x = x is an identity axiom. I don’t see reference there. > inclusion (self-reference is included in itself, x<x) and transcendence > (self-reference is more than itself, x>x). OK. (Except the tiny formula which does not make much sense to me, and seem to assume a lot of things). But with mechanism we get 8 notion of self, and transcendance is indeed derived from them. > And all these apparently contradictory properties are happening all at the > same time. So, x=x, x<x, x>x all at the same time. Without giving a theory or at least a realm, it is hard to figure out what you mean. > But there is no actual contradiction here, because self-reference is > unformalizable. The reason why I get to such weird conclusions is explored > throughout the book where a phenomenological analysis of consciousness is > done and it is shown how it is structured on an emergent holarchy of levels, > a holarchy meaning that a higher level includes the lower levels, and I > conclude that this can only happen if there is an entity called > "self-reference" which has the above mentioned properties. So as you can see, > there pretty much cannot be a mathematics of self-reference. But such theories exist. Even the fact that the first person self-reference is not formalisable is provable in a meta-theory. Self-reference is where mathematical logic has got many surprising results, and with mechanism, they are somehow directly usable. To not use them needs some non-mechanist hypothesis, for which there are no evidences, and it looks like bringing complexity to not solve a (scientific) problem. Bruno > > I will also present about self-reference at The Science of Consciousness > conference this year at Interlaken, Switzerland, so if you are there we can > talk more about these issues. > > On Thursday, 11 April 2019 02:55:55 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Hi Cosmin, > > It seems your conclusion fits well with the conclusion already given by the > universal machine (the Gödel-Löbian one which are those who already knows > that they are Turing universal, like ZF, PA, or the combinators + some > induction principle). > > Self-reference is capital indeed, but you seem to miss the mathematical > theory of self-reference, brought by the work of Gödel and Löb, and Solovay > ultimate formalisation of it at the first order logic level. You cite > Penrose, which is deadly wrong on this. > > In fact incompleteness is a chance for mechanism, as it provides almost > directly a theory of consciousness, if you are willing to agree that > consciousness is true, indubitable, immediately knowable, non provable and > non definable, as each Löbian machine is confronted to such proposition all > the “time”. But this enforces also, as I have shown, that the whole of > physics has to be justified by some of the modes of self-reference, making > physics into a subbranch of elementary arithmetic. This works in the sense > that at the three places where physics should appear we get a quantum logic, > and this with the advantage of a transparent clear-cut between the qualia > (not sharable) and the quanta (sharable in the first person plural sense). > > You seem to have a good (I mean correct with respect to Mechanism) insight on > consciousness, but you seem to have wrong information on the theory of the > digital machines/numbers and the role of Gödel. Gödel’s theorem is really a > chance for the Mechanist theory, as it explains that the digital machine are > non predictable, full of non communicable subjective knowledge and beliefs, > and capable of defeating all reductionist theory that we can made of them. > Indeed, they are literally universal dissident, and they are born with a > conflict between 8 modes of self-apprehension. In my last paper(*) I argue > that they can be enlightened, and this shows also that enlightenment and > blasphemy are very close, and that religion leads easily to a theological > trap making the machine inconsistent, except by staying mute, or referring to > Mechanism (which is itself highly unprovable by the consistent machine). > > Bruno > > > >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] <javascript:>. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >> <javascript:>. >> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout >> <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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