> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>>
>> The physics of Game of Thrones
>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>>
>> <https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/>
>
> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>
> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That is
> not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is the
> case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’
> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is
> correct.
>
> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our
> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be
> the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics
> would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make
> Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for
> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>
>
>
>
>>
>> in another number?
>>
>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>
> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining (every)thing.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then it
has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
>
> Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>
> <https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like>
>
> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary
> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of
> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}.
Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that the
mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, and why is
explained in most of my papers.
> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?
Because the sum on all computations is unique.
That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an apparent
physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. It justify
the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the shape of a
mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.
> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what is
> "explained”?
Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which I do
all along).
>
> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely
> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model
> reality.
That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know already
that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. Would all
material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional calculus,
there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.
Bruno
>
> - pt
>
>
>
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