> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:53:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics >>> >>> The physics of Game of Thrones >>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/ >>> >>> <https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/> >> >> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism. >> >> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That >> is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is >> the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ >> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is >> correct. >> >> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our >> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be >> the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics >> would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make >> Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for >> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> in another number? >>> >>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality? >> >> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining (every)thing. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model. > > I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then it > has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism). > > > > >> >> Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}): >> >> >> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like >> >> <https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like> >> >> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary >> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of >> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}. > > Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it. > > How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that > the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, and > why is explained in most of my papers. > > > > >> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM? > > Because the sum on all computations is unique. > > That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an apparent > physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. It justify > the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the shape of a > mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses. > > > > >> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what is >> "explained”? > > Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which I > do all along). > > > >> >> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely >> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model >> reality. > > That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know > already that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. > Would all material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional > calculus, there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws. > > Bruno > > > > > The puzzle is that if one looks at the literal SM formula shown here: > > > https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png > <https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png> >
It is somehow justified by the data, and some theoretical ideas, in the book by Alain Connes and Matilde Marcolli: Non Commutative Geometry, Quantum Filed and Motives. That is page 167 of that book, and I am not up there. Yet, the main ideas are rather well explained in the more readable book by Vic. Stenger. But both Alain Connes and Vic Stenger are doing physics, and so they assumes much more than what is permitted when we assume computationalism, where even the starting ideas of Vic Stenger have to be derived from arithmetic (using also the mechanist principle of the invariance of consciousness for some digital functional substitution made at some level). Now, having said that, it is clear that Alain Connes suspect that equation to be related at least to the arithmetical reality of the prime numbers, and his work is among those work in fundamental physics which illustrates deep relations between physics and number theory. For a logician, that insight makes sense. Elementary arithmetic is Turing universal, and is thus an acceptable “theory” of Everything. But there are some reason to believe that the distribution of the prime numbers encodes the full complexity of the marriage between addition and multiplication, which is responsible for that Turing universality, and this should be captured by the Riemann zeta function, as it contains global information on all primes. Unfortunately, even if the correct universal quantum field theory is successfully extracted from the elementary arithmetic of the prime number, or other sort of numbers, that would still be not quite satisfactory, for a computationalist, because that theory should still be extracted from arithmetic through the mathematics of arithmetical self-reference to get right the distinctions and the relations between the first person plural quanta and the first person singular quanta, beyond to get right the reason of the physical observations existence. > what if all the "2"s were changed to "3"s (or any "editing" like that). The theory will no more predict what we observe. (Physicist answer) But that is independent of the fact that with Mechanism, we have to derive the correct physics from arithmetical (or theoretical computer science) self-reference theory. See my papers for an explanation of the why, and the how, and what has been already be done. In a nutshell, it can be shown that a digital machine (in the non material sense of Turing, Church, Post, Gödel, Kleene, etc.) is unable to distinguish introspectively (to feel) the difference between processed by a this or that universal number/machine. This leads to a first person indeterminacy, “lived” by the machine concerned, on all its consistent accessible continuations in the arithmetical computations, or in the universal dovetailing on all computations, and the physical reality has to be recovered by a statistics on those computations. That is very hard to do in any brute direct way, but it is easy to extract the logic of the “measure one” (and zero) by using the fact that incompleteness makes it impossible to see that []p, []p & p (knowledge), []p & <>t, (observation, bet) and []p & <>t & p are equivalent extensionally. And indeed, on the partial computable propositions (the sigma_1 arithmetical propositions) this gives different quantum logics, with a semantic of “alternate histories”, close to the “consistent histories” of Omnes and Griffith, but also Gell-Man & Hartle. The little textbook by Chris J. Isham (Lecture on Quantum theory, the Mathematical and Structural Relations, Imperial College Press, 1995, London) provides some explanation on the relation between quantum logic and “many-world” (QM without collapse). Another quite useful and a bit older book on this is the book by Richard Hugues: The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1989). Of course they do not address the mind-body issue, which enforces a “many-histories” interpretation of elementary arithmetic, on which a theorem similar to Gleason theorem is expected, unless mechanism is wrong. You might perhaps study my papers: Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem. Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23567157 Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html (sane04) > > One gets from L_{SM(2)}) (the one above) to L_{SM(3)}, where the 2s have been > replaced by 3s. > > Why would L_{SM(2)}) be the "necessary" theory, or could L_{SM(3)} "work" as > a different physics? Of course, today we don’t know. If the “2 or 3” is not settled by the “unique physics”, it would mean that such number are geographical/contingent differences, and that we can access consistent extensions with 2, and consistent extensions with 3 in arithmetic. Bruno > > - pt > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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