On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 8:56:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> > wrote: > > > > On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:53:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics >>> >>> *The physics of Game of Thrones* >>> >>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/ >>> >>> >>> >>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism. >>> >>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. >>> That is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if >>> that is the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = >>> phi_u’ extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if >>> mechanism is correct. >>> >>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our >>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would >>> be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and >>> physics would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would >>> make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for >>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> in another number? >>> >>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality? >>> >>> >>> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining >>> (every)thing. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model. >> >> >> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, >> then it has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism). >> >> >> >> >> >> Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}): >> >> >> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like >> >> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary >> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of >> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}. >> >> >> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it. >> >> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, >> that the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. >> How, and why is explained in most of my papers. >> >> >> >> >> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM? >> >> >> Because the sum on all computations is unique. >> >> That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an >> apparent physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. >> It justify the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the >> shape of a mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses. >> >> >> >> >> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what >> is "explained”? >> >> >> Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which >> I do all along). >> >> >> >> >> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely >> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model >> reality. >> >> >> That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know >> already that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. >> Would all material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional >> calculus, there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> > The puzzle is that if one looks at the literal SM formula shown here: > > > https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png > > > It is somehow justified by the data, and some theoretical ideas, in the > book by Alain Connes and Matilde Marcolli: Non Commutative Geometry, > Quantum Filed and Motives. That is page 167 of that book, and I am not up > there. > Yet, the main ideas are rather well explained in the more readable book by > Vic. Stenger. > > But both Alain Connes and Vic Stenger are doing physics, and so they > assumes much more than what is permitted when we assume computationalism, > where even the starting ideas of Vic Stenger have to be derived from > arithmetic (using also the mechanist principle of the invariance of > consciousness for some digital functional substitution made at some level). > > Now, having said that, it is clear that Alain Connes suspect that equation > to be related at least to the arithmetical reality of the prime numbers, > and his work is among those work in fundamental physics which illustrates > deep relations between physics and number theory. > > For a logician, that insight makes sense. Elementary arithmetic is Turing > universal, and is thus an acceptable “theory” of Everything. But there are > some reason to believe that the distribution of the prime numbers encodes > the full complexity of the marriage between addition and multiplication, > which is responsible for that Turing universality, and this should be > captured by the Riemann zeta function, as it contains global information on > all primes. > > Unfortunately, even if the correct universal quantum field theory is > successfully extracted from the elementary arithmetic of the prime number, > or other sort of numbers, that would still be not quite satisfactory, for a > computationalist, because that theory should still be extracted from > arithmetic through the mathematics of arithmetical self-reference to get > right the distinctions and the relations between the first person plural > quanta and the first person singular quanta, beyond to get right the reason > of the physical observations existence. > > > > > > > > > > what if all the "2"s were changed to "3"s (or any "editing" like that). > > > The theory will no more predict what we observe. (Physicist answer) > > But that is independent of the fact that with Mechanism, we have to derive > the correct physics from arithmetical (or theoretical computer science) > self-reference theory. See my papers for an explanation of the why, and the > how, and what has been already be done. > > In a nutshell, it can be shown that a digital machine (in the non material > sense of Turing, Church, Post, Gödel, Kleene, etc.) is unable to > distinguish introspectively (to feel) the difference between processed by a > this or that universal number/machine. This leads to a first person > indeterminacy, “lived” by the machine concerned, on all its consistent > accessible continuations in the arithmetical computations, or in the > universal dovetailing on all computations, and the physical reality has to > be recovered by a statistics on those computations. > > That is very hard to do in any brute direct way, but it is easy to extract > the logic of the “measure one” (and zero) by using the fact that > incompleteness makes it impossible to see that []p, []p & p (knowledge), > []p & <>t, (observation, bet) and []p & <>t & p are equivalent > extensionally. And indeed, on the partial computable propositions (the > sigma_1 arithmetical propositions) this gives different quantum logics, > with a semantic of “alternate histories”, close to the “consistent > histories” of Omnes and Griffith, but also Gell-Man & Hartle. > > The little textbook by Chris J. Isham (Lecture on Quantum theory, the > Mathematical and Structural Relations, Imperial College Press, 1995, > London) provides some explanation on the relation between quantum logic and > “many-world” (QM without collapse). Another quite useful and a bit older > book on this is the book by Richard Hugues: The Structure and > Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Harvard University Press, > Massachusetts, 1989). Of course they do not address the mind-body issue, > which enforces a “many-histories” interpretation of elementary arithmetic, > on which a theorem similar to Gleason theorem is expected, unless mechanism > is wrong. > > You might perhaps study my papers: > > Marchal B. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body > problem. Prog Biophys Mol Biol; 2013 Sep;113(1):127-40 > https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23567157 > > Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress > in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. > https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 > > B. Marchal. The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations. In 4th > International System Administration and Network Engineering Conference, > SANE 2004, Amsterdam, 2004. > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > (sane04) > > > > > > One gets from L_{SM(2)}) (the one above) to L_{SM(3)}, where the 2s have > been replaced by 3s. > > Why would L_{SM(2)}) be the "necessary" theory, or could L_{SM(3)} "work" > as a different physics? > > > > Of course, today we don’t know. If the “2 or 3” is not settled by the > “unique physics”, it would mean that such number are > geographical/contingent differences, and that we can access consistent > extensions with 2, and consistent extensions with 3 in arithmetic. > > Bruno > > >
I know of the Vic Stenger (laws-from-symmetry) approach (from the old Atoms and the Void group). *The Comprehensible Cosmos: Where Do the Laws of Physics Come From?* https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Comprehensible_Cosmos.html?id=09sPAQAAMAAJ It's possible that the "laws" of nature - physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, ..- can come from a single simplicity, or that it's more of a babel - like the theoretical sciences suggest - with theoretical physics, chemistry, biology having separate vocabularies, frameworks, and theories. - pt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
