> On 6 May 2019, at 08:19, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mon, May 6, 2019 at 3:59 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: > On 5/5/2019 10:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: > > On Sun, May 5, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: >> On 5/5/2019 7:30 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> On 5/5/2019 5:57 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> On Sunday, May 5, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/5/2019 3:49 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> How do we know other humans are conscious (we don't, we can only suspect >>>>> it). >>>>> >>>>> Why do we suspect other humans are conscious (due to their outwardly >>>>> visible behaviors). >>>>> >>>>> Due to the Church-Turing thesis, we know an appropriately programmed >>>>> computer can replicate any finitely describable behavior. Therefore a >>>>> person with an appropriately programmed computer, placed in someone's >>>>> skill, and wired into the nervous system of a human could perfectly mimic >>>>> the behaviors, speech patterns, thoughts, skills, of any person you have >>>>> ever met. >>>>> >>>>> Do you dispute any of the above? >>>> >>>> It assumes you could violate Holevo's theorem to obtain the necessary >>>> program. >>>> >>>> >>>> You could find the program by chance or by iteration (for the purposes of >>>> the thought experiment). >>> >>> In those cases you could never know that you had been successful. >>> >>> >>> The question wasn't whether or not we would succeed, but given that we know >>> it is possible to succeed, given there ezists a program that could convince >>> you it was your friend, why doubt it is consciousness? >> >> I don't think I would doubt it was conscious even if it just acted as >> intelligent as some stranger. But note that it would have to be >> interactive. So I think Wegner's point is that makes its computations not >> finitely describable. >> >> Who is Wegner in this context, and what was his point? >> >> I don't see how any computation could be not finitely describable, given >> that any programs can be expressed as a finite integer. > > This guy, Peter Wegner, that pt referred to indirectly. > http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf > <http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf> His point is that > human consciousness is an interactive program that receives arbitrary and > unknown inputs from the environment and is modified by those inputs. He > calls this model a PTM, Persistent Turing Machine, because it keeps a memory > and doesn't overwrite it. Of course you can say that whatever the > environmental input is, it can be included in the TM code, but then it is > potentially inifinite. > > Brent > > This is essentially the point that both Turing and Goedel made when they > pointed out that human consciousness is not Turing emulable
Turing is mechanist. I am not sure what make you think that Turing would have said that “consciousness is not Turing emulable” (although it is a sophisticate truth of mechanism, but not known at the time of Turing). In fact Turing opted the positivism of his time, and consider only the question through the behaviour. He said only that consciousness is not testable, except through behaviour (and invented his “Turing test” for that matter. He would have admitted YD and of course CT. For Gödel, it is more complex, but he also defended version of mechanism, taking into account that a concrete machine is a sequence of machines,, but he added CT, and would have doubted YD, but only because he did not see that YD+CT is opposite to naturalism. Gödel was linking, despite his platonism, mechanism and materialism. My contribituon is that mechanism is antipode of weak-materialism. > -- it involves intuitive leaps that are not algorithmic, presumable coming > from an uncodable environment. Even without. Even for the universal machine doing nothing more than self-introspection, her consciousness (related to []p & p) is not definable, for reason related to the fact that knowledge and truth are not definable by any machine, when the range of that knowledge and truth is vast enough to encompass the machine itself. Now, no machine can know which computations support her, and this too add to the non computability of an environment, when there is one (which is always a relative indexical notion). Bruno > > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4CF50707-F2A7-44FF-91C3-39E214112F71%40ulb.ac.be. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
