From: *Jason Resch* <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:47 PM Bruce Kellett <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 10:18 AM Jason Resch <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 7:02 PM Bruce Kellett
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 9:36 AM Jason Resch
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Would it make a difference if they compute the
same function?
Not from the perspective of the function. If the
computation is truly the same, there is no way the
software can determine it's hardware.
If so then you might as well say it would make a
difference if they were run on different hardware.
From the outside it might seem different. E.g.
instead of silicon some other element, foreign to the
chemistry of this universe, might make for a more
appropriate substrate.
But the computations that comprise a conscious mind also,
ipso facto, comprise the whole universe.
I don't see how this follows. Is the computer on your desk the
whole universe? Is it not able to run an isolated computation
which is not affected by what other parts of the universe are
doing?
The computer on my desk is not conscious!
Maybe. I'm not sure we can conclude anything so easily. But in any
case it can illustrate the point that a computation need not be
identical with the whole of the universe that contains it.
Not all computations are conscious. But those that are must include a
large part, if not all, of the physical universe.
So if the computations are the same, the conscious, AND
THE UNIVERSE in which it resides, are the same. There can,
therefore, be no "outside" from which the consciousnesses
and universes are different.
Couldn't what we take to be the physical universe be a
simulation run in computer within a very different universe?
Clearly then the outside and inside view would be very different.
But the theory is that the physical universe is a statistical
construct over all computations running through your conscious self.
You're jumping ahead to the final result of the computation, and
continue to jump back and forth between different levels/definitions
of universe.
If the theory is to make any sense, any reference to "the universe" must
be consistent with every other reference to "the universe".
To clarify, let me enumerate stages of the argument such that we can
be clear which one we are speaking of:
1. Your brain can be replaced with a functionally equivalent physical
component which implements its functions digitally (here we change
nothing about our assumption of what the physical universe is)
2. Following from #1, your consciousness can supervene on an
appropriately programmed digital computer
That implies that my consciousness is just a single computation,
potentially implemented on a linear Turing machine.
3. Due to Church Turing and #2, the underlying implementation of the
computer (the programming language, the physical material, the laws of
physics, the universe it happens to run in) are irrelevant, only the
functional equivalence at the low-enough level (substitution level) is
important to preserve consciousness (note that nothing to this point
has changed anything about our assumption of reality, the ontology, etc.)
4. Assuming arithmetical realism (which implies the existence of all
computations) and #3, this implies all conscious states exist in
arithmetic. (this makes redundant the assumption of physical universes
that are distinct from physical universes, here we modify our
ontological assumptions about what a physical universe is)
Why should we assume arithmetical realism?
5. Given #4, and the fact that an infinite number of indistinguishable
programs implement your conscious state (e.g. different below your
substitution level), and given that these programs may diverge in the
future, then making predictions about future experiences (the focus of
physics) now becomes a statistical question regarding the distribution
of unique programs existing below your substitution level. We have
now reached the "reversal" (the laws of physics can be derived from
the arithmetic concerning conscious programs which exist
arithmetically, here we acknowledge that no observer exists in any
single universe).
If the programs are indistinguishable, how can they 'diverge in the
future'. It has not been specified what part of the execution stream of
any program gives rise to some conscious moment -- is it short or long;
one machine state or many; in sequence or not?
I have a real problem understanding what might be meant by the
statistical question that determines your actual future. Statistics
applies to the behaviour of ensembles of individuals. The individuals
are not affected by the statistics. So if there are an infinite number
of computations passing through my current conscious state, diverging in
the future (as in the past), then that corresponds to many individuals
that might share some experience -- there is no single individual that
encapsulates the statistics of the ensemble.
So from the evolution of the view of what is meant by physical
universe, we see there are at least 3 connotations:
A) The first view where a universe is a causally isolated physical
structure which may or may not contain observers
B) The second view where a universe is a relatively stable (perhaps
shared) observation in the mind of some observer(s)
C) The third view where there exists a unified set of metaphysical
laws, applicable to all observers, and in principle these laws can be
derived from the arithmetic of self-reference, there is no longer the
notion of an observer which belongs to a universe as each observer is
supported by an infinity of similar, but distinct computations
These concepts of 'the universe' are not consistent. If you are claiming
that notion C) can be obtained by an argument starting with A), then
your argument is incoherent.
So when you say "the theory is that the physical universe is a
statistical construct over all the computations running through your
conscious self", you are correct that this is the logical end and
conclusion of the theory of computationalism. But when I said you
could implement any consciousness in any universe where it is possible
to build a Turing machine, I am talking about the "level A" type
universe. (which I acknowledge to be redundant and eventually
eliminated in the theory, but use this example for pedagogical purposes).
Any concept introduced for pedagogical purposes must be consistent with
the endpoint of the argument. That is not the case here. You start with
an independent physical universe and claim to derive a universe based on
an infinity of conscious computations. This is a reductio.
So any external universe is part of that construct through your
consciousness. So appealing to an external universe running a
simulation does not help at all.
Remember, consciousness is the sum over all computation
that pass through that particular conscious state, so in
this theory your AI, be it in silicon or the Game of Life,
cannot be conscious, because it is a single computation.
That all subjectively indistinguishable computations going
through that state are a possibility means the consciousness
cannot identify itself with any one particular thread of
computation. In this sense that consciousness is not the same
as one of the programs passing through that state. But to say
the consciousness is not identical with one of the
computations is different from saying that computation is not
conscious.
The trouble here is that that is an unproven assumption.
It follows from there being a level of digital substitution (the
computationalist assumption). Let's say we can substitute your
consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom in your neuron
to a precision of 20 decimal places. This means we could also
substitute your consciousness with a computer that emulates each atom
using a precision of 50 decimal places, or 100. Your consciousness
would be no different. However, given enough time these simulations
would eventually diverge.
That relates to substrate independence: it says nothing about different
threads of computation. You take one thing to imply something completely
different -- which is illogical.
If the future of any conscious moment depends on the statistics
over the infinite number of computations running through that
state, then a single computation gives a conscious moment that
does not have a coherent future.
I think we are in agreement here. The experiences of a single
computation would/could eventually discover it has deviated from the
normal expected statistics.
Taking statistics of individual conscious moments is not a meaningful
exercise.
Neither does a single computation exist in a coherent world, since
physics, and the appearance of matter, is also the result of the
statistics over the infinite number of computations.
Once we replace our "level A" view of physics, with the realization in
"level C" that there is no physical world, then it becomes another
question altogether where we can really perform computations or not,
or just create the appearance in our own minds of running computations.
So answering "Yes" to the doctor is merely a mental aberration?
However I believe that physical universes exist as programs which
themselves contain sub-programs which are observers. Otherwise I am
not sure how we would explain our apparently shared reality.
The existence of an independent third person world is certainly a
problem for computationalism. You have not solved that problem here.
Who am I e-mailing if not some other conscious observer with which is
connected somehow as part of a larger structure? This also implies
that if I, as an actor in this larger program, fashion a computer, it
can implement another sub-program which may also be an observer. True
our infinite diverging paths of consciousness will diverge and split
and recombine, etc., but in each case we can expect to find ourselves
to be a computation that is consistent with our existence.
That is probably the biggest leap of faith of them all -- how can you
possible ensure this? Most computations do not correspond to anything
useful for our existence.
To be conscious as a human generally would imply a sub program that
has existed in a much larger program which has been on going for long
enough and with the right conditions for human beings to evolve and
arise. For this reason, I believe the local physical laws (not
global) are strongly dependent/correlated with the mind in question.
Why do local physical laws differ from the global laws? If the laws are
mind independent at the start of the argument, they cannot become
dependent on your mind, or anyone else's, through the course of the
argument.
And consciousness must be embedded in a coherent "world" in order
to exist.
Does it? I am not so sure.
What are you conscious of? Consciousness itself? Or of the qualia of
experience of an external world?
Bruce
This makes one suspect that YD + CT, leading to computationalism,
is not a coherent theory.
Based on your questions and objections I can tell you have put a lot
of good thought into these matters. I look forward to our future
discussions on the topic.
Jason
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