On 5/9/2019 11:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is
associated with the way information is processed.
That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many
body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem
becomes in part a justification of the appearances from a
statistic to all computations going through our brain. Then
incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a quantum
reality.
This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is
physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain in
software, and insofar as the same kinds of information
processing occur, it would be conscious in the same kind of way.
Only if it exists in the same kind of world.
Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is
possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible to
instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe.
But the same inference implies that all universes are the same. If a
universe is just whatever can be computed then there are no different
universes and to say the physics of the universe is simulated and "not
primary" is the same as saying everything in the universe is simulated
and not primary. This the end point of everythingism in which it
devolves into nothingism.
Brent
This is little different from saying you could have a representation
of the first 100 binary digits of Pi in many different kinds of
universes, so long as their physics allows for digital representations.
Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep Blue
as one running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life universe, or on a
computer in an alternate (of the 10^500) other string theory
universes. CT implies it is impossible for any software to determine
its underlying hardware, and this in determinism extends to the
underlying physics of that hardware.'
Jason
I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between
brains and consciousness without requiring matter, and provides
a framework for understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of
machines. All that's required is to assume there is something it
is like for computation to occur.
Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion
of computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we
don’t need to assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we
cannot assume more, without exploding the number of aberration
histories.
Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to get a
desired outcome? Is it empiricism?
This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging
from the self-referential statistics on all computations with the
inferred physics. And it match well, were physics itself miss the
relation with the first person perspective, necessarily (assuming
mechanism). A materialist has a way out: to invoke infinite to
make the link brain-mind one-one, which it cannot be once we do
the digital truncation.
That's only because you are assuming the mind is infinite...which
seems a little arrogant.
Brent
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