On 5/9/2019 12:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 2:21 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/9/2019 11:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>
wrote:
One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is
associated with the way information is processed.
That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many
body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem
becomes in part a justification of the appearances from a
statistic to all computations going through our brain. Then
incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a
quantum reality.
This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is
physical is beside the point. You could implement a brain
in software, and insofar as the same kinds of information
processing occur, it would be conscious in the same kind of
way.
Only if it exists in the same kind of world.
Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it
is possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible
to instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe.
But the same inference implies that all universes are the same.
That doesn't follow. It's more like saying one universe is FORTRAN
and another is LISP. Both have the property of universality, but they
operate very differently.
Would it make a difference if they compute the same function? If so
then you might as well say it would make a difference if they were run
on different hardware.
Then you might have other universes where universal machines can't be
built.
If a universe is just whatever can be computed
I didn't say a universe is what can be computed, only that in
universes where computers can be built, then any conscious state can
be accessed (according to the computational theory of mind).
Then it's not clear to me what you mean by "can be" and "accessed".
Bruno's idea is that if computation exists, and it does in arithmetic,
then all conscious states (and I say implicitly therefore all physics)
exists. Does accessed=exists?
Brent
Jason
then there are no different universes and to say the physics of
the universe is simulated and "not primary" is the same as saying
everything in the universe is simulated and not primary. This the
end point of everythingism in which it devolves into nothingism.
Brent
This is little different from saying you could have a
representation of the first 100 binary digits of Pi in many
different kinds of universes, so long as their physics allows for
digital representations.
Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep
Blue as one running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life
universe, or on a computer in an alternate (of the 10^500) other
string theory universes. CT implies it is impossible for any
software to determine its underlying hardware, and this in
determinism extends to the underlying physics of that hardware.'
Jason
I find this idea compelling because it makes the link
between brains and consciousness without requiring matter,
and provides a framework for understanding consciousnesses
of other kinds of machines. All that's required is to
assume there is something it is like for computation to occur.
Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the
notion of computation is a purely arithmetical definition,
so that we don’t need to assume more than Robison
arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without exploding
the number of aberration histories.
Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to
get a desired outcome? Is it empiricism?
This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics
emerging from the self-referential statistics on all
computations with the inferred physics. And it match well,
were physics itself miss the relation with the first person
perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist
has a way out: to invoke infinite to make the link
brain-mind one-one, which it cannot be once we do the
digital truncation.
That's only because you are assuming the mind is
infinite...which seems a little arrogant.
Brent
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