On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < [email protected]> wrote:
> > > On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <[email protected]> wrote: > > One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated > with the way information is processed. > > > > That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many > body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in > part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all > computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what > this take the shape of a quantum reality. > > > > > This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is > beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as > the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in > the same kind of way. > > > Only if it exists in the same kind of world. > > Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible to instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe. This is little different from saying you could have a representation of the first 100 binary digits of Pi in many different kinds of universes, so long as their physics allows for digital representations. Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep Blue as one running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life universe, or on a computer in an alternate (of the 10^500) other string theory universes. CT implies it is impossible for any software to determine its underlying hardware, and this in determinism extends to the underlying physics of that hardware.' Jason > > I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and > consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for > understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's > required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to > occur. > > > Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of > computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to > assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without > exploding the number of aberration histories. > > > Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to get a desired > outcome? Is it empiricism? > > This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging from the > self-referential statistics on all computations with the inferred physics. > And it match well, were physics itself miss the relation with the first > person perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a > way out: to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind one-one, which it > cannot be once we do the digital truncation. > > > That's only because you are assuming the mind is infinite...which seems a > little arrogant. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/653b1eb9-9dfb-9b98-0909-2351a9a3edd1%40verizon.net > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/653b1eb9-9dfb-9b98-0909-2351a9a3edd1%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiBpjcjXC2nVkV-4Y5854h6GNZm5tYbVoPnK%2Bdz1KmzOQ%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
