On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 2:18 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 14 May 2019, at 01:27, Bruce Kellett <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 9:19 AM Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> On Mon, May 13, 2019, at 22:36, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: >> >> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst >> possible failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing >> I can be certain to exist. >> >> >> I think this misunderstands what science does. In the words of John von >> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to >> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical >> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, >> describes observed phenomena. >> >> >> I agree with you and von Neumann on this, and this is precisely why I >> used the words "account for" instead of "explain". I literally mean that >> consciousness does not fit the physicalist models, it appears as magic or >> supernatural. To be precise, and avoid empty authoritative proclamations, I >> make clear what I mean: >> >> 1) Darwinian evolution is a theory (a brilliant theory, possibly my >> favorite scientific theory of all times) that accounts for biological >> complexification. Under physicalism, it fails to account for consciousness. >> There is simply no reason for the "lights to be on". A functionally >> equivalent p-zombie does the trick. >> >> 2) So maybe it's a spandrel. But again we have the magic step, because >> spandrels must arise from something. What are the first principles? >> >> 3) Or maybe it's "what the brain does", as many physicalists like to say. >> My body as mass, because the atoms that make up my body amount to that >> mass. What amounts to my consciousness? What are the building blocks? There >> is no accounting, there is no description in yours or van Neumann's sense. >> >> It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he is >> not able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism fails. >> It goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible with >> Platonism. I am pointing out a direct observation of mine that, thus far, >> is not compatible with physicalism. >> >> Telmo. >> > > You are too quick. You have not shown that consciousness is incompatible > with physicalism. > > > Consciousness is only incompatible with physicalism + mechanism. > So just drop mechanism! > It is nice, because the canonical theory of consciousness given by the > machine itself explains consciousness (as best as logically possible), and > explain constructively the appearance of matter, so that we can evaluate > and test the theory by comparing with nature. > You begin to sound like a string theorist -- we have a constructive theory that will make predictions that can be compared with experiment -- but not just yet. We still have to work out exactly what the theory (viz. string theory/physics via mechanism) is...... String theory has clearly failed. Its supposed promise has not been fulfilled, and all the predictions that it has ever made (and there aren't many) have failed the experimental test. Exactly the same is true of mechanism -- your supposed prediction of quantum mechanics is rather like the string theorists' claim that they have predicted gravity! Just give Brent's engineering approach some time to work. > > > Read my papers. Physicalism and Mechanism cannot work together at all. You > have to abandon Mechanism to save physicalism. But the evidences favours > much more mechanism than physicalism (which seems to be only an habit of > thought). > > Platonism has not accounted for the physical universe > > > That is plain false. Mechanism explains entirely, qualitatively and > qualitatively, where the belief in a physical universe comes from, where > physicalism has to make an ontological commitment, which we try to always > avoid when doing science. > The semantic thesis of scientific realism claims that the entities posited by our best theories are the actual "furniture of the universe" -- which is an ontological claim. So, in that view, science is completely about ontological claims -- that is what the scientific realist is about -- finding out what the universe is made of (viz. its ontology)! > Only Mechanism explain why we believe in a physical universe, why that > belief is correct, despite that physical universe is no more an ontological > thing. > > -- Bruno keeps saying that this is just "a work in progress”. > > Yes, but the whole propositional theories have already been found. Some > comparison have already been done, and physicalism is already refuted (when > assuming mechanism), and tested plausibly false by the experiments, notably > those already done in quantum mechanics. > Your claims about quantum mechanics are laughable. See the comments on string theory and gravity above. > So the same for consciousness. > > > Non computationalist theory of consciousness are up to now too much fuzzy > to be tested. Such things do not yet exist, and even if Mechanism is > refuted, you will need the computationalist theory of mind (Mechanism) to > develop a genuine non computationalist theory. > Pure hubris. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTWpcb9ED3RNA9pyZB301cHSWC7cJ-qtBaV%2BFOLbMD02Q%40mail.gmail.com.
