> On 16 May 2019, at 03:43, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 5/15/2019 11:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 13 May 2019, at 22:20, Jason Resch <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Mon, May 13, 2019 at 6:08 AM Bruno Marchal <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>>> On 9 May 2019, at 20:47, Jason Resch <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>>> <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <[email protected] >>>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated >>>>>> with the way information is processed. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many >>>>> body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in >>>>> part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all >>>>> computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what >>>>> this take the shape of a quantum reality. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is >>>>>> beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar >>>>>> as the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious >>>>>> in the same kind of way. >>>> >>>> Only if it exists in the same kind of world. >>>> >>>> >>>> Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is >>>> possible to build a computer in some universe, >>> >>> In some reality (usually people understand “physical universe” when we use >>> the term “universe”, but the reality needs only to be anything Turing >>> complete, so the arithmetical reality is a universe in the general sense: >>> it runs all programs. >>> >>> >>> >>>> it is possible to instantiate/access any conscious state from that >>>> universe. This is little different from saying you could have a >>>> representation of the first 100 binary digits of Pi in many different >>>> kinds of universes, so long as their physics allows for digital >>>> representations. >>>> >>>> Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep Blue as >>>> one running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life universe, or on a >>>> computer in an alternate (of the 10^500) other string theory universes. CT >>>> implies it is impossible for any software to determine its underlying >>>> hardware, and this in determinism extends to the underlying physics of >>>> that hardware.’ >>> >>> Actually I disagree here. The hardware eventually is absolute, as it is a >>> first person projection on infinitely many computation. We would not have >>> found Quantum Mechanics, we could rightly suspect mechanism to be false, or >>> to be in a malevolent “bostromian” simulation. >>> >>> You are right when you say that CT makes impossible for a machine to >>> determine which universal machine run it, by introspection, but the machine >>> can know that below its substitution level, the hardware is an emerging >>> pattern from all computations relative to the actual state. That is why >>> physics becomes derivable from arithmetic or from any Turing universal >>> theory. >>> >>> >>> Doesn't the ability to determine whether you are supported by arithmetical >>> computations vs. a simulation one hinge on the capacity to make (and >>> remember the result of) measurements of what exists below one's >>> substitution level? >> >> Yes. That happens in the normal reality. If you look below your substitution >> level, you see the witnessing of the “parallel computations”, and they have >> to obey to the material mode (quantum mode apparently). >> >> But imagine that you are sent, without knowing, in a virtual reality. Then, >> if it is rough, you will surely guess that you are in a virtual reality, >> like in a lucid dream, or like in a video game. > > This is incoherent. If you are the series of computations there is no > perspective from which you can see you are in a dream. You only recognize > dreams by comparing them to reality.
You are implicitly begging the question of reality, but you are right. To see if we are in a simulation it is enough to compare what we see with the physical reality, which is given by the statistic on all computations, where there are not pixels, but quantum-like events. You can’t conclude we are awake, but if the obersvbale are different from the material mode of the universal machine, we know that computationalism is false, or that we are in a (malevolent) simulation. > >> But the “malevolent” want to fail you, so he make a more precise simulation, >> and then a more precise. At some point, if the simulation is totally >> correct, you will, from your first person view, be continued again by the >> arithmetical computations, and “you” are in the arithmetic again, with the >> right physics. Or he does again only an approximation, and again, you will >> depart from the physical reality, and it is like seeing the pixels, even if >> this is made in a more sophisticated way, by testing directly the semantics >> of X1*, or testing Bell’s inequality, etc. >> >> >> >>> >>> What is the meaning of "below substitution level" for a mind completely >>> disconnected from its environment, like Deep-Blue engaged in repeated games >>> of self-play? >> >> It is like addiction, or obsession, losing yourself in a “non normal” game. >> Maybe Deep Blue was a not good example. If you disconnect yourself >> completely from the environment, I speculate that you get the initial >> consciousness experience, of the “virgin” universal machine. It is like a >> “out-of-body experience” except that it is deeper, more like an >> out-of-reality experience. You get a consciousness state which is out of >> time, out of space, out of everything. Total amnesia, and amazingly enough >> some Recall, but hardly memorable. I guess all this. Similar state are >> described in various reports of experience, near death, or after some shows, >> or by using some plants, etc. >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Is it possible to know what it is like only to be one very specific >>> computation (thereby being eternally stuck there) or is there always the >>> possibility of waking up out of it like a bad dream? >> >> Transhumanist experience can make people looping, like with any computer. >> But real loop are not first person loop, and the first person consciousness >> will still differentiate in arithmetic. > > Now it seems you are invoking dualism in which consciousness is more than the > computation that you assumed it to be. It is more … from the first person view. Nothing has been added to the ontology. Yes, arithmetic seen from inside looks (and is, in the phenomenological sense) bigger than arithmetic. It is a bit like with Skoleme paradox, where a denumerable structure is not denumerable from inside a model/semantic/reality). Bruno > > Brent > >> We can wake up, but that does not always mean that “where we wake up” is >> nicer than the “bad dream”. You can wake up in a smaller jail … You can wake >> up in a more hard reality, a bit like being born during a war. We have >> partial control, only partial, locally. I would say. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >>> >>> Jason >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhScFjonoU_8QBux%3DsQsVa11OLmb_SZeGhTMXPSR-%3D7Sw%40mail.gmail.com >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUhScFjonoU_8QBux%3DsQsVa11OLmb_SZeGhTMXPSR-%3D7Sw%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/67B2B51C-5309-4F42-ACF4-095A2DE85AF1%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/67B2B51C-5309-4F42-ACF4-095A2DE85AF1%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b86271d8-3aed-4178-50e4-4aafe3db1767%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b86271d8-3aed-4178-50e4-4aafe3db1767%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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