On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 2:50:49 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: > > > > On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 2:21 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> >> On 5/9/2019 11:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> >> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < >> [email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <[email protected] >>> <javascript:>> wrote: >>> >>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated >>> with the way information is processed. >>> >>> >>> >>> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many >>> body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in >>> part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all >>> computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what >>> this take the shape of a quantum reality. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is >>> beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as >>> the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in >>> the same kind of way. >>> >>> >>> Only if it exists in the same kind of world. >>> >>> >> Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is >> possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible to >> instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe. >> >> >> But the same inference implies that all universes are the same. >> > > That doesn't follow. It's more like saying one universe is FORTRAN and > another is LISP. >
> Jason > > Our universe is more like LISP than Fortran, I think. Actually more like process-oriented programming* (e.g. Actor model). * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process-oriented_programming @pphilipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/148cf924-14b9-403c-8109-3097b15f5f1c%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
