> On 10 May 2019, at 01:35, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 3:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: > > > On 5/9/2019 12:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote: >> >> >> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 2:21 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> wrote: >> >> >> On 5/9/2019 11:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <[email protected] >>>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated >>>>> with the way information is processed. >>>> >>>> >>>> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many >>>> body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in >>>> part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all >>>> computations going through our brain. Then >>>> incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a quantum reality. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is >>>>> beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as >>>>> the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in >>>>> the same kind of way. >>> >>> Only if it exists in the same kind of world. >>> >>> >>> Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is >>> possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible to >>> instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe. >> >> But the same inference implies that all universes are the same. >> >> That doesn't follow. It's more like saying one universe is FORTRAN and >> another is LISP. Both have the property of universality, but they operate >> very differently. > > Would it make a difference if they compute the same function? > > Not from the perspective of the function. If the computation is truly the > same, there is no way the software can determine it's hardware. > > If so then you might as well say it would make a difference if they were run > on different hardware. > > From the outside it might seem different. E.g. instead of silicon some other > element, foreign to the chemistry of this universe, might make for a more > appropriate substrate. > > >> Then you might have other universes where universal machines can't be built. >> >> If a universe is just whatever can be computed >> >> I didn't say a universe is what can be computed, only that in universes >> where computers can be built, then any conscious state can be accessed >> (according to the computational theory of mind). > > Then it's not clear to me what you mean by "can be" and "accessed". > > Here I want to be careful not to use the word create or generate, as Bruno > would point out that you can't really create conscious states, they already > exist. Just like no one can create the number 5. But you can create a > consciousness that you would otherwise not have direct access to, and be able > to interview it, converse with it, etc. by realizing it in your local > environment and feeding inputs into it and reading outputs from the emulation. > > Bruno's idea is that if computation exists, and it does in arithmetic, then > all conscious states > > I would add a small clarification, (which I think you implied but did not > state) "if all computation exists" then "all conscious states exist" -- > assuming computationalism > > (and I say implicitly therefore all physics) exists. > > I think Bruno uses the word physics a bit differently than in the sense you > and I might, as the science of making predictions of future experiences. In > this sense, you might say there is a different physics for each mind, but you > could also say there is a single (overarching) "meta-physics" or > "trans-physics" whose more general rules are applicable to all experiences > of all minds.
Yes, given by the modes of the self imposed by incompleteness. That is something that physics cannot do: to explain why there is an (apparent) physical universe. Mechanism makes arithmetic predicting that there is an observable reality, in which prediction can be made. Physics usually postulate this. > > Does accessed=exists? > > Think of it like a GoL universe, which we might take to exist a priori under > some form of mathematical realism. By running a computer simulation of that > GoL universe, we can access it, explore it, run experiments in it, extract > information from it, and so on. This is what I meant by accessing the > conscious state. It is is perhaps more correctly thought of as "recreating" > rather than "creating”. Yes, the physical reality becomes an indexical, but is the same for all numbers or machines. The physical laws are justified to be laws. With the pure empirical method, we cannot distinguish a physical law from a possible geographical fact. Bruno > > Jason > > > Brent > >> >> Jason >> >> then there are no different universes and to say the physics of the universe >> is simulated and "not primary" is the same as saying everything in the >> universe is simulated and not primary. This the end point of everythingism >> in which it devolves into nothingism. >> >> Brent >> >>> This is little different from saying you could have a representation of >>> the first 100 binary digits of Pi in many different kinds of universes, so >>> long as their physics allows for digital representations. >>> >>> Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep Blue as >>> one running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life universe, or on a computer >>> in an alternate (of the 10^500) other string theory universes. CT implies >>> it is impossible for any software to determine its underlying hardware, and >>> this in determinism extends to the underlying physics of that hardware.' >>> >>> Jason >>> >>>>> >>>>> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and >>>>> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for >>>>> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's >>>>> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to >>>>> occur. >>>> >>>> Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of >>>> computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to >>>> assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without >>>> exploding the number of aberration histories. >>> >>> Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to get a desired >>> outcome? Is it empiricism? >>> >>>> This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging from the >>>> self-referential statistics on all computations with the inferred physics. >>>> And it match well, were physics itself miss the relation with the first >>>> person perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a >>>> way out: to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind one-one, which it >>>> cannot be once we do the digital truncation. >>> >>> That's only because you are assuming the mind is infinite...which seems a >>> little arrogant. >>> >>> Brent >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list >>> <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/653b1eb9-9dfb-9b98-0909-2351a9a3edd1%40verizon.net >>> >>> 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