> On 9 May 2019, at 20:47, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > wrote: > > > On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated with >>> the way information is processed. >> >> >> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many body-representation >> in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in part a justification of >> the appearances from a statistic to all computations going through our >> brain. Then incompleteness explains what this take the shape of a quantum >> reality. >> >> >> >> >>> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is beside >>> the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as the same >>> kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in the same >>> kind of way. > > Only if it exists in the same kind of world. > > > Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is possible > to build a computer in some universe,
In some reality (usually people understand “physical universe” when we use the term “universe”, but the reality needs only to be anything Turing complete, so the arithmetical reality is a universe in the general sense: it runs all programs. > it is possible to instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe. > This is little different from saying you could have a representation of the > first 100 binary digits of Pi in many different kinds of universes, so long > as their physics allows for digital representations. > > Deep-Blue running on a computer in this universe is the same Deep Blue as one > running in an a computer in the Game-of-Life universe, or on a computer in an > alternate (of the 10^500) other string theory universes. CT implies it is > impossible for any software to determine its underlying hardware, and this in > determinism extends to the underlying physics of that hardware.’ Actually I disagree here. The hardware eventually is absolute, as it is a first person projection on infinitely many computation. We would not have found Quantum Mechanics, we could rightly suspect mechanism to be false, or to be in a malevolent “bostromian” simulation. You are right when you say that CT makes impossible for a machine to determine which universal machine run it, by introspection, but the machine can know that below its substitution level, the hardware is an emerging pattern from all computations relative to the actual state. That is why physics becomes derivable from arithmetic or from any Turing universal theory. Bruno > > Jason > >>> >>> I find this idea compelling because it makes the link between brains and >>> consciousness without requiring matter, and provides a framework for >>> understanding consciousnesses of other kinds of machines. All that's >>> required is to assume there is something it is like for computation to >>> occur. >> >> Yes. Then it is sad that so few people are aware that the notion of >> computation is a purely arithmetical definition, so that we don’t need to >> assume more than Robison arithmetic. Worst, we cannot assume more, without >> exploding the number of aberration histories. > > Doesn't this worry you, that you are trimming your theory to get a desired > outcome? Is it empiricism? > >> This makes mechanism testable, by comparing the physics emerging from the >> self-referential statistics on all computations with the inferred physics. >> And it match well, were physics itself miss the relation with the first >> person perspective, necessarily (assuming mechanism). A materialist has a >> way out: to invoke infinite to make the link brain-mind one-one, which it >> cannot be once we do the digital truncation. > > That's only because you are assuming the mind is infinite...which seems a > little arrogant. > > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/653b1eb9-9dfb-9b98-0909-2351a9a3edd1%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/653b1eb9-9dfb-9b98-0909-2351a9a3edd1%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list > <https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiBpjcjXC2nVkV-4Y5854h6GNZm5tYbVoPnK%2Bdz1KmzOQ%40mail.gmail.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CA%2BBCJUiBpjcjXC2nVkV-4Y5854h6GNZm5tYbVoPnK%2Bdz1KmzOQ%40mail.gmail.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout > <https://groups.google.com/d/optout>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/E392F266-0034-4609-AC83-268F80132158%40ulb.ac.be.
