On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:19:31 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: >> >> >> >> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: >> >> >> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running >> in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious. >> >> >> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem. >> >> >> > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html : > > *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical > makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never > have experiences, no matter what its causal organization * > > That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. > > And it's he only thing engineers need to pay attention to, Now AI > engineers just want to make smart robots, not conscious robots. But if they > did, then that above is all that matters. > > (In any case, I don't think Chalmers himself believes in what he wrote in > papers 25 years ago, per Philip Goff.) > > @philipthrift >
I should say above, AI engineers want to make functionally-smart robots. That's a better word. Back in the '80s I was working on autonomous smart weapons, or autonomous smart missiles, which could "see" on their own and make decisions (I sort of hate say.) That was DARPA's name. If a smart missile were conscious, It would be committing suicide. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/468a71b4-87ca-4c95-b84f-5034afddaf3c%40googlegroups.com.
