On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation
running in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
*for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of
biochemical makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based
computer could never have experiences, no matter what its causal
organization
*
/*A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical
system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On
this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain
are not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although
they may be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's
abstract causal organization, an organization that might be realized in
many different physical substrates.*//*
*//*
*//*In this paper I defend this view.*/
That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway.
Brent
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