On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 5:40:56 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > > > On Sun, 16 Jun 2019 at 00:21, Philip Thrift <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 4:06:27 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sat, 15 Jun 2019 at 14:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Thus the rejection of panpsychism can be overcome by logical analysis, >>>> historical and cultural reflection, and perhaps even by chemical >>>> ingestion. >>>> >>>> >>>> https://highexistence.com/panpsychism-3-reasons-why-our-world-brimming-sentience/ >>>> >>>> via @PeterSjostedtH <https://twitter.com/PeterSjostedtH> >>>> >>>> >>>> Not quite my panpsychic materialism, but chemistry is involved! >>>> >>>> Panpsychiam is not consistent with functionalism, whereby if you change >>>> a part of the brain with a functional equivalent the subject notices no >>>> difference. This is because panpsychism is fundamentally substrate >>>> dependent. But there are good reasons for assuming that consciousness is >>>> substrate independent. >>>> >>>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >> >> What are those? >> > > It would lead to a decoupling of consciousness and behaviour or to partial > zombies, entities which undergo gross changes in consciousness but neither > change their behaviour nor recognise it. See this paper by David Chalmers: > > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou >
See this paper by David Chalmers (which I think is written more than 20 years after the above paper). At least Chalmers seems to be closer now to Philip Goff and Hedda Mørch. http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf *Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism* David J. Chalmers .. In my Hegelian argument, the thesis is materialism, the antithesis is dualism, and the synthesis is panpsychism. The argument for the thesis is the causal argument for materialism (and against dualism). The argument for the antithesis is the conceivability argument for dualism (and against materialism). Synthesized, these yield the Hegelian argument for panpsychism. In effect, the argument presents the two most powerful arguments for and against materialism and dualism, and motivates a certain sort of panpsychism as a view that captures the virtues of both views and the vices of neither. It turns out that the Hegelian argument does not support only panpsychism. It also supports a certain sort of *panprotopsychism*: roughly, the view that fundamental entities are protoconscious, that is, that they have certain special properties that are precursors to consciousness and that can collectively constitute consciousness in larger systems. Later in the article, I will examine the relative merits of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, and examine problems that arise for both. ... ,I think that the Hegelian argument gives good reason to take both panpsychism and panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can find a reasonable solution to the combination problem for either, this view would immediately become the most promising solution to the mind–body problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and sustained attention. @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c2dd889a-cce5-4f00-911e-5543f472395a%40googlegroups.com.
