On Sunday, June 16, 2019 at 12:36:52 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > > > On Sun, 16 Jun 2019 at 10:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > >> >> >> On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 5:40:56 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Sun, 16 Jun 2019 at 00:21, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 4:06:27 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, 15 Jun 2019 at 14:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Thus the rejection of panpsychism can be overcome by logical >>>>>> analysis, historical and cultural reflection, and perhaps even by >>>>>> chemical >>>>>> ingestion. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> https://highexistence.com/panpsychism-3-reasons-why-our-world-brimming-sentience/ >>>>>> >>>>>> via @PeterSjostedtH <https://twitter.com/PeterSjostedtH> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Not quite my panpsychic materialism, but chemistry is involved! >>>>>> >>>>>> Panpsychiam is not consistent with functionalism, whereby if you >>>>>> change a part of the brain with a functional equivalent the subject >>>>>> notices >>>>>> no difference. This is because panpsychism is fundamentally substrate >>>>>> dependent. But there are good reasons for assuming that consciousness is >>>>>> substrate independent. >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>>> >>>> >>>> What are those? >>>> >>> >>> It would lead to a decoupling of consciousness and behaviour or to >>> partial zombies, entities which undergo gross changes in consciousness but >>> neither change their behaviour nor recognise it. See this paper by David >>> Chalmers: >>> >>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html >>> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >> >> >> >> See this paper by David Chalmers (which I think is written more than 20 >> years after the above paper). At least Chalmers seems to be closer now to >> Philip Goff and Hedda Mørch. >> >> http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf >> >> *Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism* >> David J. Chalmers >> >> .. >> >> In my Hegelian argument, the thesis is materialism, the antithesis is >> dualism, and the >> synthesis is panpsychism. The argument for the thesis is the causal >> argument for materialism >> (and against dualism). The argument for the antithesis is the >> conceivability argument for dualism >> (and against materialism). Synthesized, these yield the Hegelian argument >> for panpsychism. In >> effect, the argument presents the two most powerful arguments for and >> against materialism and >> dualism, and motivates a certain sort of panpsychism as a view that >> captures the virtues of both >> views and the vices of neither. >> >> It turns out that the Hegelian argument does not support only >> panpsychism. It also supports a >> certain sort of *panprotopsychism*: roughly, the view that fundamental >> entities are protoconscious, that is, that they have certain special >> properties that are precursors to consciousness >> and that can collectively constitute consciousness in larger systems. >> Later in the article, I will >> examine the relative merits of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, and >> examine problems that >> arise for both. >> >> ... >> ,I think that the Hegelian argument gives good reason to take both >> panpsychism and >> panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can find a reasonable solution to >> the combination >> problem for either, this view would immediately become the most promising >> solution to the >> mind–body problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and >> sustained attention. >> > > The “fading qualia” argument in the earlier paper is a robust one, not > dependent on any assumptions about consciousness, or even a definition > beyond a minimal operational one: you know it if you have it. It has not > been refuted. Although Chalmers has panpsychist tendencies he has not > addressed the clash with his own argument. > >> -- > Stathis Papaioannou >
I (and Philip Goff) is glad he's evolving. :) @philipthrift -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/b58db369-2bdf-474f-8b96-7a1b8287b34d%40googlegroups.com.
