On Sun, 16 Jun 2019 at 10:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 5:40:56 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >> >> >> >> On Sun, 16 Jun 2019 at 00:21, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 4:06:27 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sat, 15 Jun 2019 at 14:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Thus the rejection of panpsychism can be overcome by logical analysis, >>>>> historical and cultural reflection, and perhaps even by chemical >>>>> ingestion. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> https://highexistence.com/panpsychism-3-reasons-why-our-world-brimming-sentience/ >>>>> >>>>> via @PeterSjostedtH <https://twitter.com/PeterSjostedtH> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not quite my panpsychic materialism, but chemistry is involved! >>>>> >>>>> Panpsychiam is not consistent with functionalism, whereby if you >>>>> change a part of the brain with a functional equivalent the subject >>>>> notices >>>>> no difference. This is because panpsychism is fundamentally substrate >>>>> dependent. But there are good reasons for assuming that consciousness is >>>>> substrate independent. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>> Stathis Papaioannou >>>> >>> >>> What are those? >>> >> >> It would lead to a decoupling of consciousness and behaviour or to >> partial zombies, entities which undergo gross changes in consciousness but >> neither change their behaviour nor recognise it. See this paper by David >> Chalmers: >> >> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> > > > > See this paper by David Chalmers (which I think is written more than 20 > years after the above paper). At least Chalmers seems to be closer now to > Philip Goff and Hedda Mørch. > > http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf > > *Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism* > David J. Chalmers > > .. > > In my Hegelian argument, the thesis is materialism, the antithesis is > dualism, and the > synthesis is panpsychism. The argument for the thesis is the causal > argument for materialism > (and against dualism). The argument for the antithesis is the > conceivability argument for dualism > (and against materialism). Synthesized, these yield the Hegelian argument > for panpsychism. In > effect, the argument presents the two most powerful arguments for and > against materialism and > dualism, and motivates a certain sort of panpsychism as a view that > captures the virtues of both > views and the vices of neither. > > It turns out that the Hegelian argument does not support only panpsychism. > It also supports a > certain sort of *panprotopsychism*: roughly, the view that fundamental > entities are protoconscious, that is, that they have certain special > properties that are precursors to consciousness > and that can collectively constitute consciousness in larger systems. > Later in the article, I will > examine the relative merits of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, and > examine problems that > arise for both. > > ... > ,I think that the Hegelian argument gives good reason to take both > panpsychism and > panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can find a reasonable solution to > the combination > problem for either, this view would immediately become the most promising > solution to the > mind–body problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and > sustained attention. > The “fading qualia” argument in the earlier paper is a robust one, not dependent on any assumptions about consciousness, or even a definition beyond a minimal operational one: you know it if you have it. It has not been refuted. Although Chalmers has panpsychist tendencies he has not addressed the clash with his own argument. > -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypVWdkW56sBztdDTznEcAEcAkScd%2B5ZL87ZuokGdmqAq-A%40mail.gmail.com.
