> On 16 Jun 2019, at 09:20, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 5:40:56 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > > On Sun, 16 Jun 2019 at 00:21, Philip Thrift <[email protected] > <javascript:>> wrote: > > > On Saturday, June 15, 2019 at 4:06:27 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote: > > > On Sat, 15 Jun 2019 at 14:16, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <>> wrote: > > > Thus the rejection of panpsychism can be overcome by logical analysis, > historical and cultural reflection, and perhaps even by chemical ingestion. > > https://highexistence.com/panpsychism-3-reasons-why-our-world-brimming-sentience/ > > <https://highexistence.com/panpsychism-3-reasons-why-our-world-brimming-sentience/> > > via @PeterSjostedtH <https://twitter.com/PeterSjostedtH> > > > Not quite my panpsychic materialism, but chemistry is involved! > > Panpsychiam is not consistent with functionalism, whereby if you change a > part of the brain with a functional equivalent the subject notices no > difference. This is because panpsychism is fundamentally substrate dependent. > But there are good reasons for assuming that consciousness is substrate > independent. > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > What are those? > > It would lead to a decoupling of consciousness and behaviour or to partial > zombies, entities which undergo gross changes in consciousness but neither > change their behaviour nor recognise it. See this paper by David Chalmers: > > http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html <http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html> > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > > > See this paper by David Chalmers (which I think is written more than 20 years > after the above paper). At least Chalmers seems to be closer now to Philip > Goff and Hedda Mørch. > > http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf > > Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism > David J. Chalmers > > .. > > In my Hegelian argument, the thesis is materialism, the antithesis is dualism,
Of course, with Mechanism, dualism is still a “Materialism” in the weak sense that I used, and the antithesis ion materialism is just immaterialism. To make sense of this panpsychism, you need to assume a non computationalist theory of mind. His analysis of Everett in one of its book was also going in the anti-mechanist conception of mind. Bruno > and the > synthesis is panpsychism. The argument for the thesis is the causal argument > for materialism > (and against dualism). The argument for the antithesis is the conceivability > argument for dualism > (and against materialism). Synthesized, these yield the Hegelian argument for > panpsychism. In > effect, the argument presents the two most powerful arguments for and against > materialism and > dualism, and motivates a certain sort of panpsychism as a view that captures > the virtues of both > views and the vices of neither. > > It turns out that the Hegelian argument does not support only panpsychism. It > also supports a > certain sort of panprotopsychism: roughly, the view that fundamental entities > are protoconscious, that is, that they have certain special properties that > are precursors to consciousness > and that can collectively constitute consciousness in larger systems. Later > in the article, I will > examine the relative merits of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, and examine > problems that > arise for both. > > ... > ,I think that the Hegelian argument gives good reason to take both > panpsychism and > panprotopsychism very seriously. If we can find a reasonable solution to the > combination > problem for either, this view would immediately become the most promising > solution to the > mind–body problem. So the combination problem deserves serious and sustained > attention. > > @philipthrift > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c2dd889a-cce5-4f00-911e-5543f472395a%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c2dd889a-cce5-4f00-911e-5543f472395a%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/725713B0-2751-49C4-9151-C5A17184F83D%40ulb.ac.be.
