On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 11:02:36 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Jun 2019, at 19:17, PGC <[email protected] <javascript:>> wrote: > > > > On Sunday, June 23, 2019 at 12:15:15 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 21 Jun 2019, at 18:18, PGC <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Friday, June 21, 2019 at 12:56:59 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 20 Jun 2019, at 17:20, PGC <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thursday, June 20, 2019 at 3:58:17 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Now that does not make sense to me, but this is because your ontology >>>> is unclear for me. Your text is not quite helpful, and I might ask you to >>>> formalise your ontology and perhaps the phenomenology too, to make precise >>>> sense on this. It is unclear how you would test experimentally such >>>> statements. >>>> >>> >>> You "might" ask him. I would advise against such a move as he may >>> reverse the question and ask you something equivalent. E.g. he may ask: Can >>> you show me Bell's theorem in the combinator thread or using any equivalent >>> universal machinery? Just to make precise sense of things? To see in action >>> how to test such statements, ontologies, phenomenologies experimentally, in >>> a formal setting of your choice, beyond retrodiction on others' work? PGC >>> >>> >>> This is done in detail in my papers (and longer test). >>> >>> If you are interested, I can expand this here. >>> >> >> You demand formal precision from other's claims and you "read my papers" >> me without titles, pages, or exact references? >> >> Nobody has to give you permission to expand, you do so or you don't. >> Let's see Bell in combinators then and as many longer tests as you like. >> Since it's all done and obvious, it's a simple copy and paste matter. PGC >> >> >> >> As I have explained in some posts, we can start from any universal >> machinery, be them given by the natural numbers with addition and >> multiplication, or by the combinators with applications. Then we extend >> this with classical logical induction axioms. For example, for the numbers: >> >> P(0) & [For all n (P(n) -> P(s(n)))] ->. For all n P(n), >> >> Or for the combinators: >> >> P(K) & P(S) & [For all x y ((P(x) & P(y)) -> P(xy)) -> For all x P(x). >> >> P is for any first order formula in the language. >> >> That leads to the Löbian machine, who provability predicate obeys to the >> “theology” G*. >> >> The material modes are given by the first person modes ([]p & p, []p & >> <>t, []p & <>t & p). Incompleteness imposes that those modes obeys very >> different logics, despite G* show them extensional equivalent: it is the >> same part of the arithmetical reality (the sigma_1 one) seen in very >> different perspective. >> >> A simple Bell’s inequality is (A & B) => (A & C) v (B & ~C). >> >> Using the inverse Goldblatt representation of quantum logic in the modal >> logic B, the arithmetical rendering of that inequality is >> >> []<>A & []<>B => []([]<>A & []<>B) v [([]<>B & []~[]<>C) >> >> With the box and the diamond being the modal boxes of the logic of the >> martial modes described above. >> >> There are very few reason that this inequality is obeyed, and it is >> expected that the material modes do violate Bel’s inequality, but >> unfortunately, the nesting of boxes when tested on a G* theorem prover >> makes this not yet solved. It is intractable on today’s computer. This is >> not a bad sign, actually, in the sense that the quantum tautologies >> *should* be only tractable on a quantum computer, if the material modes >> would really be the one of nature, assuming quantum mechanics correct. >> >> See for example, for more details: (or my long French text “Conscience et >> Mécanisme). >> >> Marchal B. The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics, Progress in >> Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 2015, Vol. 119, Issue 3, 368-381. >> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 >> > Eric Vandenbussche has solved some open problems when working toward that >> solution. >> > > As stated previously, tractability is not clear. And while your account > may suffice to you: There is no global conspiracy of physicalists that is > holding platonists hostage, the jury is still out - even by your own > measure, in domains of description of your personal choosing - as the > notions in your thought experiments along with the testability implied by > your reasoning, in particular duplicating machines and ideally working > quantum computers, do not exist at present. They may exist at some point, > but even if progress in those domains seems plausible, everybody with a bit > of experience under the sun knows what happens when wishes get fulfilled. > > > Maybe. This gives the impression that someday we might know that Mechanism > is true, but that will never been rationally proved, only rationally > inferred. Like with any other theory, we must be open to change our mind. > If Z1* (a material mode) depart too much from quantum logic, that would > raise a sane doubt toward computationalism. >
The burden of proof always falls to those with extraordinary claims. No other scientists lay claim to the origins of reality. The default position is that it is unclear or that we haven't advanced far enough. So that extraordinary claim calls for extraordinary - even immaculate - sort of evidence. Who knows how the problem could be posed and what powerful machines or new mathematics we could invent? That's being open to change our mind... keep working at it. > It is one of the reason to call it theology: we need some amount of fait > to say “yes” to the doctor, and we cannot impose the Mechanist practice to > others (with the inevitable complex question of how to decide for kids, > etc.). > > > Expressing something linguistically - all intentions aside - always "imposes". That's the nature of language and discourse. It's up to folks to use this power responsibly or fail at survival at some point. > > Having clarity with ourselves, respecting ourselves even with a negative > result is more scientific than infinities of pipe dreams, no matter how > well argued and how seductive a unified ensemble theory, some purist > arithmetical dream of body and mind feels to us. For even if our wishful > thinking got everything right on some intuitive level, it would still be > disingenuous to assume "we got it" before we had the quality of evidence > that satisfies our peers and ourselves. > > > My work is recognise by those who read it. My opponents are non scientist, > and do philosophy in the non greek sense: they claim to know that a > (primitive) material world exists. My work renew with Plato’s skepticism, > and illustrate that we have not yet solve the mind-body problem. It suggest > also a new theory (quantum mechanics without collapse and without wave, > just partially computable arithmetical sentences. > Ok but if it remains intractable then why all the quantum ambition? Is it like a Freudian quantum envy? Like my quantum and proofs are longer, more elaborate, and precise than yours? ;-) > > > > > > And while I may have been critical and harsh these past years, I have no > issue with your person and/or your work. Your discourse assumes notions > who's existential status/tractability remains unclear at this time. > > > > I assume Digital Mechanism. Then I prove that physics has to be like QM > has already illustrated. QM is basically incomprehensible today, and the > fault is the Aristotelian belief in (boolean or not) independent substances. > > I'm not sure for above reasons: extraordinary claims demand extraordinary evidence and since that isn't obtainable now believing in independent substances cannot be considered a crime or sin against science. > > > > Therefore assuming "comp" or "mechanism" to be absolutely clear and > established beyond doubt is premature. > > > That will never happen. Xe cannot prove anything about “reality”, not even > that there is one. > > We can know consciousness, but still not prove it. > > Many people believe that mechanism and materialism go hand in hand, where > I show them incompatible, and then, thanks to QM, the experimental facts > sides with mechanism, against materialism. But that can change tomorrow, or > in billions years. > This is where your discourse has merit: where, how, why those facts side/support mechanism and our ability or lack thereof to test the thing. The nested boxes of Bell you came up with with Eric Vandenbussche: are we sure that Telmo or Russell can't get their hands on a machine powerful enough to muscle. Why not try? Telmo's Biceps are most certainly huge by now, right? Perhaps with a powerful enough machines today and Goldblatt tattooed on his biceps, the world or the machine will see the light! lol > > I do not defend the idea that Mechanism is true, only that it is > incompatible with (Weak) Materialism, and that the empirical facts side > with Mechanism, until now. > Again: that burden of proof has to be extraordinary or the metaphysics has to be extraordinary. Before that happens, we're speculating in mathematical or philosophy of science realms. > > If people want to tarnish themselves, their histories, their work, their > reputations in this world with certainties, nobody in their right mind > should stop them. But peer systems, and yeah I may naively kid myself that > this list constitutes some loose peer discussion system, don't exist > exclusively to control and bust the chops of messiahs with the truth: > > > When doing science, we never claim truth. We provide theories, and means > to refute them. If confirmed, we can still not conclude that it is true. > > Reasonable confidence, pinning down what that is, finding consensus, would already get this discussion out of the realm of speculation. And a negative result, that there is no silver bullet up to some point in time is a valuable contribution too. But I will keep my practical belief in water as a magical primitive resource that replenishes me with elan vital life force. Same for good food. And if you don't believe it's ontologically primitive, then that just means you lack evidence of how well I cook. Proof? Nobody I've cooked for has denied this fundamental metaphysical proof, including myself, which is why I have to follow Telmo on the pursuit for magical biceps, abs, etc. otherwise my expansion just progresses horizontally. And that is incompatible with platonism. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/026b3ff4-ba24-4d2b-83e8-de25a489b5cf%40googlegroups.com.
