> On 24 Jun 2019, at 19:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On 6/24/2019 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> That sounds a bit observer dependent. >>>> >>>> Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of >>>> arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. >>>> An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the >>>> self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p). >>>> >>> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same >>> physical world. >> >> It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we >> get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics. > > How exactly "the same". Can you show that the observed physics is the only > possible physics?
Yes. Compare the physics in the head of the universal machine with the observation. What we see, if it is does not belong to that machine’s internal physics, but is consistent with it, can be defined as the local geography-history (indexically contingent, and usually treated with the diamond in the modes. If there is a contradiction between the machine’s physics and the observation, then mechanism is false, or we are in a malevolent simulation. > >> >> Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the >> physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the >> change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.). >> >> Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe, > > I don't see that explanation? I might ask what you miss in the UDA, which shows that physics is reduced to an indexical statistics on all relative computations ((aka sigma_1 sentences, by a normal form theorem of Kleene, and some subtleties about G* and Z*). Then what are you missing in AUDA (the arithmetical translation of UDA in arithmetic). The main things have been found by Goödel, Löb, Feferman, Friedman, Boolos, Goldblatt, up to Solvay’s1976 theorem: the discovery of G and G*. The probability (a credibility or plausibility, actually) one is given, for the observable, by the logic of []p & <>t. I justify this by thought experience, Kripke semantics, and the bastard calculus in Timeaeus and Plotinus (and got evidence that Moderatus got it already from its interpretation of the Parmenides). > Why is not each person is a different universe, as they are in different > dreams. I am not sure I understand the question. Each person is supported by an infinity of computations, and they diverge, a bit like the W vs M divergence in the self-duplication, except that it is a continuous transformation of some sort. The person $are* in different dream/computations, but some type of dream are sharable and long histories develops, in the limit of all first person experience (due to the invariance of consciousness for the arithmetical delays in the stepping of the universal dovetailer). Finding the propositional modes of self-reference explains why we have bodies, soul and qualia, and why we are conscious, and why we are in front of the … unknown. But to progress, we need to progress also in the quantified modal logic of provability, and to better extracts Quantum Logic, etc. It might not work. The fact is that it works up to now, and is the only precise and testable theory addressing the Mind-Body problem, to my knowledge. Bruno > > Brent > >> and why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than >> physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non >> sharable qualia. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>. >>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/40792d73-e1bf-b0d2-de47-434be6bd6fce%40verizon.net >>> >>> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/40792d73-e1bf-b0d2-de47-434be6bd6fce%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/25AF6181-C364-43FB-84A8-838117CFA816%40ulb.ac.be >> >> <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/25AF6181-C364-43FB-84A8-838117CFA816%40ulb.ac.be?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c0a8c3d2-f8ce-d547-57ee-ee6905df7bb5%40verizon.net > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c0a8c3d2-f8ce-d547-57ee-ee6905df7bb5%40verizon.net?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/669AE6B4-A591-4153-BC87-1B6AE3BA2D73%40ulb.ac.be.
