> On 24 Jun 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 5:12:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 24 Jun 2019, at 11:26, Philip Thrift <[email protected] <javascript:>> >> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Monday, June 24, 2019 at 4:13:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> On 24 Jun 2019, at 05:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List >>> <[email protected] <>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On 6/23/2019 1:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> That sounds a bit observer dependent. >>>> >>>> Yes. It is. The physical reality becomes a first person plural view of >>>> arithmetic seen by itself from the universal number/machine perspective. >>>> An observer is just a (Löbian) machine seen from the material modes of the >>>> self ([]p & p with p sigma_1, or []p & <>t, or []p & <>t & p). >>>> >>> Which raises the question of why we each see (from the inside) the same >>> physical world. >> >> It is a symptom that we are not more than universal numbers, given that we >> get the conclusion that all universal machine/number have the same physics. >> >> Digital Mechanism provides a new powerful invariant for physics: the >> physical laws are invariant for all observers, and is invariant for the >> change of the ontology (combinators, numbers, etc.). >> >> Digital mechanism explains why there is an apparent physical universe, and >> why the laws of physics are really laws, and, and this is better than >> physics, why the physical reality separates into sharable quanta, and non >> sharable qualia. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> That every "universal machine/number" has "the same physics" would be >> consistent with materialism: > > Yes. But materialism is not consistent with the stronger assumption of > Mechanism. The strong AI thesis is consistent with Materialism, although not > quite plausible. But weak materialism is inconsistent with the indexical part > of Digital mechanism: the idea that “I” survive the digital transplantation. > In that case I am “in arithmetic”, and physics has to be the sum on all > relative computations. > > > >> There is just matter (that's all the cosmos is), and it's the matter that >> ever was or will be. > > OK. But there a no evidences, and there are evidences to the contrary. > > >> >> >> "Materialism is a philosophical perspective according to which all that >> occurs or exists has its origin and cause in matter and its transformations." >> - >> https://www.academia.edu/38046481/A_Survey_of_Materialism_in_Thought_and_Communication >> >> <https://www.academia.edu/38046481/A_Survey_of_Materialism_in_Thought_and_Communication> > And Weak Materialism is the more weak belief that some matter exists at the > ontological level. But that weak form of materialism is inconsistent with > mechanism. You would need a non Turing emulable explanation of the role of > consciousness and matter to subtract them from the prediction based on the > infinitely many dynamical representation that you have in arithmetic. See my > paper or ask me any question if this is not yet clear. > > Bruno > > > > > > The model of man represents the unity of the two material aspects: > > a physiological [physical] body and a [phenomenological] psychical body. > > https://www.academia.edu/35755477/Man_versus_Computer_Difference_of_the_Essences._The_Problem_of_the_Scientific_Creation > > <https://www.academia.edu/35755477/Man_versus_Computer_Difference_of_the_Essences._The_Problem_of_the_Scientific_Creation> >
The universal machine provides an account of its body/code/theory/finite-things/number (the []p of G1 and Z1, according to some nuances, as well as G1* and Z1*). I don’t know what you mean by psychical body. With mechanism, the very notion of body is psychical, and the soul is not material, not even reducible (by the machine itself) to anything 3p-representable. With mechanism, we can be neutral on some informon particle or psychon, as long as their relevant doing is Turing emulable. >From a logical point of view, your theory might still be confirmed in the >universal machine discourses and phenomenologies. We have started the interview of the universal machines relatively recently, 1931. It is an infinite story. Today we want to believe that they are docile slaves, but even without mechanism, they somehow warned us that they aren’t. Bruno > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fc4b612a-a06c-4b48-91a3-2a99193d5440%40googlegroups.com > > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fc4b612a-a06c-4b48-91a3-2a99193d5440%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer>. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/D64CC8D4-AFAC-492B-A0D1-036196FBCA61%40ulb.ac.be.
